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This study attempts to evaluate the potential
feasibility and effectiveness of the Youth Service Bureau
strategy proposed by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Specifically,
the study attempts to identify the constraints which are
likely to be imposed on a Youth Service Bureau by the
criminal justice system, the youth service system, and
by the agency's funding structure. It also attempts
to identify variables of internal agency structure
which critically affect the ability of an agency to
carry out the three Youth Service Bureau goals --
diverting youths from Juvenile Court; providing delin-
quents and non-delinquents with rehabilitative services;
and preventing future delinquency by modifying youth-
related institutions and services ("systems change").
The study attempts to identify these constraints
and variables by examining the process which occurred
when the City of Cambridge attempted to implement the
YSB strategy. Information was gathered primarily
through a series of semi-structured interviews.
The principal finding of the study was that YSB goals
required conflicting program models, and thus should be
considered separately in planning delinquency programs.
The ability to develop less stigmatizing, rehabilitative
alternatives to juvenile court was found to be severely
constrained by the unwillingness of the criminal justice
system to cede responsibility for cases to a non-author-
itarian agency, and by the inability of the youth service
system to provide appropriate services for "delinquent!'
youth.
3It was also found that mode of funding, type of
internal structure, and level of dependency on criminal
justice or youth service agencies were critical factors
in determing the YSB's selection of strategies and
institutional priorities for change. It was hypo-
thesized from the Cambridge case that a horizontal
staff structure would minimize internal conflicts
over strategies and priorities. Finally, it was
found that the Cambridge YSB's opportunities to inter-
vene in the existing social structure most commonly
occurred at the fringes of existing agency mandates;
and it was hypothesized that YSB's are more likely
to produce changes in the overall shape of the service
network than to produce modifications in existing
institutions.
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CHAPTER I: THE YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU STRATEGY
Youth service bureaus were proposed by the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice in 1967 as an innovation in pre-judicial
process which would not only provide more effective
rehabilitation for juveniles than juvenile court, but
also help prevent future delinquency within the community.
The recommendation was one of the most widely implemented
recommendations of the Commission. In late 1971, the
Department of the California Youth Authority in a national
survey discovered two hundred and sixty two agencies which
state, regional and local authorities identified as Youth
Service Bureaus (ysb). 2 Sherwood Norman of the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency has estimated that over
one hundred youth service bureaus were established in 1970
alone. 3 Despite their wide implementation, very little is
known about the effectiveness of youth service bureaus.
8It will be the purpose of this thesis to examine the
value and feasibility of youth service bureaus as a strategy
for reducing the incidence of juvenile delinquency. Chapter
One will indicate the major trends in delinquency practice
and research, as well as the underlying theories of delin-
quency which led to the formulation of the ysb strategy,
and will explain the Youth Service Bureau Model. The
existing research on youth service bureaus will be sum-
marized and the major issues yet to be resolved will be
indicated. This discussion will provide a basis for
defining a set of research questions, and the methodology
used for exploring them will be indicated.
Underlying Theory and Rationale
The youth service bureau strategy was advanced in
response to several different trends in the field of de-
linquency treatment and prevention. Most directly, accord-
ing to Lloyd Ohlin, originator of the ysb concept, the
strategy responded to mounting disillusionment with the
Juvenile Court. This section will briefly examine the
reasons for that disillusionment, and indicate how it in-
fluenced the attempt to establish ysbs as an alternative
to Juvenile Court. It will also explain the Crime Commis-
sion's theory of delinquency and indicate how it affected
the type of rehabilitative and preventive approaches that
were also included in the ysb concept.
9The movement to create special courts for juveniles
was motivated by what has been characterized as the "pro-
tective, rehabilitative ideal", 4 or the desire to treat
child law-breakers "as a wise parent would deal with a
wayward child" 5 rather than as criminals subject to the
full criminal process. Consequently, juvenile court
judges were given broad discretion to intervene in the
lives of juvenile offenders and guide their "rehabilita-
tion". In the twentieth century, however, it became
increasingly apparent that juvenile courts had neither
the resources nor the expertis.e to provide special treat-
ment for juveniles, and that the new juvenile "training
schools" were no more humane than adult criminal insti-
tutions. Juvenile courts came under increasing criticism
in the 1960's with the rise of the civil rights movement;
and by 1967, there was considerable evidence that many
youth actually received more severe dispositions in
juvenile court than they would have in adult criminal
court, where rules of due process were in effect. 6 The
Crime Commission's Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency
recognized the failure of the Juvenile Court to rehabilitate
the delinquent youth and bring compassion to the child
offender. It recommended that due process be returned to
juvenile proceedings, and that a "great deal" of minor
juvenile misbehavior be handled by alternative programs
10
better equipped for rehabilitation.
The currency of "labeling theory" in the 1960's
made the need to find an alternative to Juvenile Court
appear even more pressing to the Crime Commission.
Several studies in the 1960's tended to support the theory
that processes which define individuals as deviants (called
labeling) can createnegative attitudes, both on the part
of society and the individual, which inhibit his ability
to succeed in any given context. 7 The Crime Commission
pointed out the importance of this theory for juvenile
"delinquents ":
The juvenile will wear the label longer, while he
is likely to outgrow the conduct that brought him
the badge; one who acquires the status of a de-
viant in his youth faces the prospect of lifelong
stigmatization.
They argued that official action could help to fix and
perpetuate delinquency in a child through a process in
which the individual begins to think of himself as delin-
quent and organizes his behavior accordingly. Further-
more, they postulated that the process was further rein-
forced by the effect of the labeling on the child's fami-
ly, neighbors, teachers, and peers, who would come to
expect delinquent conduct.
This theory of labeling led the Task Force to the
conclusion that official contact with the court should be
avoided wherever possible, especially for minor offenders.
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In place of the court, a less formal, and therefore less
stigmatizing process should be substituted which would
"meddle less" in children's lives. It was hypothesized
that if a program also dealt with non-delinquents, was
based in the offender's community, included youth and
other local residents as staff, and required that youth
participation be voluntaryp then the resulting process
would be less stigmatizing.
Thus the Task Force, on the basis of labeling
theory and the shortcomings of the juvenile court,
argued for the need to establish a less stigmatizing
alternative, better equipped for rehabilitating youth.
The Task Force Report fails, however, to link this
notion explicitly to a theory of rehabilitation. In dis-
cussing the rehabilitative and preventive aspects of
youth service bureaus, however, the Task Force appeared
to be responding to current trends in theories of delin-
quency causation.
The Task Force noted that there is no shortage of
theories of the etiology of delinquency. These theories
vary most significantly according to the extent that they
fix the cause of delinquency in the make-up of the indivi-
dual rather than in the structure of the society and its
institutions. The earliest theories placed primary emphasis
on deficiencies in the innate traits of individuals or on
12
their individual psychologies. More contemporary
theories have emphasized the role of immediate environ-
mental factors, such as a weak family structure or
exposure to a deviant subculture, in leading to delin-
quent behavior. Several relatively recent theories
have emphasized the role of the social structure in
promoting delinquency by blocking legitimate paths
to wealth for lower-class individuals. These theories
often suggest the formation of deviant subcultures as
an intervening variable in the causal model. 9
It is clear that the Task Force ascribed to this
latter ("structural") view of delinquency:
The Commission doubts that even a vastly improved
criminal justice system can substantially reduce
crime if society fails to make it possible for
citizens to feel a personal stake in it...The
sense of stake, of something that can be gained
or lost, can come only through real opportunity
for fulllarticipation in society's life and
growth.
The Task Force indicated that their theoretical orientation
was derived primarily from Cloward and Ohlin's Delinquency
and Ooortunity (1960). In that work, the authors sum-
marize their theory of delinquency as follows:
It is our view that pressures toward the formation
of delinquent; subcultures originate in marked dis-
crepancies between culturally induced aspirations
among lower-class youth and the possibilities of
achieving them by legitimate means...delinquency
is not, in the final analysis, a property of in-
dividuals or even of subcultures; it is a property
of the social systems in yWich these individuals
and groups are enmeshed.
13
This "structural" theory of delinquency fixes the
cause of delinquency primarily with existing "social
systems". Its broad implications for prevention stra-
tegies are fairly clear. Cloward and Ohlin indicate
that the primary focus of delinquency prevention efforts
should be on changing social systems so as to expand the
opportunities for lower-class youth to attain material
success (since they consider material success to be the
culturally-defined measure of success). Accordingly,
the Task Force indicates that "It is insuring opportunity
that is the basic goal of prevention programs." 12
The implications of this theory of delinquency
for rehabilitation programs are less obvious, and the
Task Force Report does not illuminate the transition.
The types of measures they recommend suggest, however,
that they were responding to an approach described in
the Mobilization for Youth Program's Proposal for the
Prevention and Control of Delinauency by Expanding Oppor-
tau1tes.based on the work of Cloward and Ohlin; the pro-
posal provides a rationale for working with individual
youths in order to help bridge the gap between deviant
subcultures and social "opportunity structures".
...merely providing new opportunities may not
alleviate delinquency if youngsters are not also
helped to exploit these opportunities. We noted
that people who are denied access to various social
resources soon lose the capacity to make use of
them. Indeed, they may even develop organized
patterns of living which become barriers to the
utilization of opportunity...We suggest, there-
fore, that program forms must be evolved which
14
will permit us to intervene in arresting these
self-defeating models of behavior. 13
The statement suggests that under a structural theory
of delinquency an appropriate strategy for rehabilitating
youths would be to provide them with services which will
increase their capacity to take advantage of opportunities
for success.
Later in the proposal, the authors argue that
a second major function of a rehabilitation program
should be to engage youth in efforts to change the
"social systems" which are the cause of their "alienation
from the large society". They argue that by providing
youth with opportunities for constructive expression of
alienation, a program would reduce the likelihood of
its expression in delinquent acts.
The Youth Service Bureau Model
In proposing the youth service bureau concept, the
Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency appears to have been
attempting to respond to all of these trends in thought
about the juvenile court and about rehabilitation and
prevention programs. The Task Force Report appears to
specify three levels of goals or purposes for ysbs. In
apparent order of importance, they are: to divert youths 14
from the stigmatizing effect of juvenile court; to provide
improved rehabilitative services to individual trouble-
making youths at the neighborhood level (primarily as an
15
alternative to court processing); and to increase
public pressure for better "youth development services"
as a means of delinquency prevention.
The prescribed methods for achieving these goals
are consistent with the theories of labeling, rehabili-
tation, and prevention indicated above. Unfortunately,
the program model is never specified very precisely.
The scheme for diverting youths from court and establish-
ing an alternative process primarily appears to entail a
"referral model" - i.e., the youth service bureau is en-
visioned as receiving referrals from the police and courts
and guiding those youths and others (school-, family-,
or self-referred) to the service resources of the community.
The Task Force Report makes it clear that the primary
target group for these services should be delinquents,
although troublesome or potentially troublesome non-delin-
quents should also be included.
While some of its Cysb's]cases would normally
originate with parents, schools and other sources,
the bulk of the referrals could be expected to
come from the police and the juvenile court
intake staff, and police and court referrals
should have special status in that the youth
servi e bureau would be required to accept them
all.' 5
It is emphasized that to the maximum extent possible,
acceptance of bureau services should be voluntary so as
to avoid labeling, and so that the dangers and disadvan-
tages of coercive power would not merely be transferred
16
from the juvenile court. The Task Force recognized
however, that it might be necessary to vest youth
service bureaus with the authority to refer to court
those individuals with whom they could not deal effec-
tively.
The Task Force Report also indicates to some
extent the type of rehabilitative services to be provided
and comments on how they should be provided. The types
of services could include group and individual counseling,
placement in group and foster homes, work and recreational
programs, employment counseling, and special education
(remedial, vocational). They should primarily be obtained
from community agencies, either through purchase or by
voluntary agreement with community organizations. Use of
community agencies is emphasized as a means of avoiding
the stigma of being processed by an official agency
regarded by the public as an arm of crime control. Accor-
ding to a consultant's report by Burns and Stern (which
is appended to the Task Force Report), the role of the
YSB in obtaining these services should be that of an
"advocate", "on behalf of youth whose behavior or social
situation...denies them full access to community services
and opportunities".16 Advocacy is not further defined,
however.
17
In accordance with the Mobilization for Youth
proposal, the Task Force Report also suggest a more
active role for youth in their own rehabilitation. It
suggests .that a youth's"responsible involvement" in
activities which provide more opportunities for growth
for himself and his peers will help give him "a reason
to care about his world -- a stake in a healthy society."
Thus it is indicated that youth should be encouraged to
help operate community centers, plan neighborhood organ-
ization and improvement efforts, develop programs that
will attract other youth, run youth centers of their own,
and participate in civil rights and political activities.
It is hypothesized that these activities would help keep
youths out of further trouble, since they would engage
their immediate energies and at the same time enlist them
for more long-term commitment to the goals of society.
Consonant with this concept of youth responsibility, and
involvement in expanding their own opportunities, Burns
and Stern recommend that ysbs should have local governing
boards with heavy youth representation on them.
The report is particularly vague on the issue of
how and to what extent youth service bureaus should "in-
crease pressure for better youth development services".
At one point the Task Force Report indicates simply that
the use of locally sponsored or operated organizations will
18
heighten the community's awareness of the need for
recreational, employment, tutoring and other youth
development services. It then suggests that community
residents should be involved in "engendering the sense
of public responsibility" that will be necessary to
gain support for new youth programs. Numerous other
portions of the Task Force Report suggest that obtaining
better youth development services will require changing
existing institutions as well as creating new programs.
In particular, Burns and Stern point to, "the need for
our institutions to produce better education, strengthen
family life, improve opportunities for employment, and
make...social services more relevant and more accessible
to those who need them most." 17 They indicate that
youth service bureaus should be involved in making insti-
tutions more relevant. They point out that a ysb should
have the authority to coordinate other youth services and
to bring pressures on those agencies to make their services
more relevant to the needs of "youth in difficulty". It
is suggested that this pressure could be brought to bear
on agencies if ysb staff was located in schools, recrea-
tion departments, gang projects, neighborhood development
centers, and welfare agencies. Thus the concept of pre-
vention (through the creation and modification of youth
programs) is linked to the ysb concept, but its relation
to other bureau functions is never clarified.
19
In summary, the Commission appears to describe
youth service bureaus as non-coercive, community agencies
which perform the following functions:
--diverting minor delinquents from juvenile court
by means of referrals from police, courts, and
other agencies.
--rehabilitating these youths (and other potential
"delinquents) by linking them to community-based
services and involving them in activities to
expand their own opportunities for development.
--promoting changes in current institutions, and
developing new programs so as to increase the
access of youth to ppportunities for success
Other significant features of the bureaus are the involve-
ment of youth and community persons in agency decision-
making, and the inclusion of youth and local non-professionals,
along with trained professionals as staff.
Several other writers have sought to refine the
ysb concept. The most significant of these was Sherwood
Norman of the NCCD, who produced an extensive set of
guidelines for the establishment of youth service bureaus.
Labeling them as the "the key to delinquency prevention",
Norman defines a ysb as:
a noncoercive, independent public agency established
to divert children and youth from the justice system
by (1) mobilizing community resources to solve youth
problems (2) strengthening existing youth resources
and developing new%-ones, and (3) promoting positive 18
programs to remedy delinquency-breeding conditions.
He then lists three functions of a youth service bureau as
linking referred youth to community services, developing
new resources for disadvantaged youth, and modifying
20
existing systems (institutions) which "discriminate
against troublesome...youth and...contribute to their
anti-social behavior" so as to make them responsive to
youth needs. Norman's conception is significant in that
it places much more emphasis than the Crime Commission
Report on the need for ysbs to play an active role in
modifying systems which affect youth.
For the purposes of this study),it seems reasonable
to summarize the purposes of youth service bureaus as
being three-fold: diversion of youth from the "stigmatizing
effect" of juvenile court; provision of more effective re-
habilitation through procurement of community services
and involvement of youth in systems change; and long-range
prevention of delinquency through social change. Systems,
or social, change, for the purpose of this study, is de-
fined as any change in the number, internal structure, or
patterns of interaction of institutions (or services) with-
in a system or related systems such that youth access to
power or services is improved. 19
Thus both labeling theory and a structural theory
of delinquency causation formed the basis for the develop-
ment of the youth services bureau strategy. The implicit
assumption of this strategy is that all three ysb func-
tions can be carried out within the framework of one
comprehensive agency; i.e., that one agency can operate
within the framework of the criminal justice system in
21
obtaining referrals, within the framework of the youth
service/child welfare system in securing services and
modifying institutional patterns, and within the frame-
work of the lower-class community in enlisting youth
cooperation and participation in systems change. The
issue which then must be addressed is whether or not the
systems and settings within which a ysb must operate are
sufficiently compatible to tolerate all three types of
activities.
State of Existing Research
Despite the wide implementation of the youth
service bureau concept, very few studies have been con-
ducted to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness
of the strategy. Most of the literature to date on ysbs
has been largely descriptive or conjectural. Scattered
reports have provided descriptions of local programs, and
a recently completed national study of youth service bureaus,
commissioned by the Youth Development and Delinquency
Prevention Administration, provided gross national sta-
tisticson the number, types of programs, target populations,
and level of funding of youth service bureaus across the
country. These studies do not contain a sufficient level
of empirical detail, however, to permit analysis of the
factors which affect the ability of a youth service bureau
to fulfill the role envisioned by the President's Crime
Commission.
22
Most of the other literature on youth service bureaus 20
has consisted of critiques, clarifications or elaborations
of the Crime Commission's proposals. Most of these cri-
tiques have been based on conjecture, rather than empiri-
cal studies, and their assumptions are as badly in need
of testing as those of the Commission. The controversy
in the literature has primarily focused on the relative
emphasis which should be given to each goal and on the
variables of agency design which would be most conducive
to their attainment. A number of authors have argued that
some of the most important variables would be:
--the percentage of cases which come from the police
and courts
--the types of offenses which the ysb handles
--the strength of the formal ties of the youth
service bureau to the police and courts
--the amount of coercive authority vested in ysbs
--whether the agency is public or private
--the percentage of staff which is non-professional
--the extent to which youth participate in or control
the agency
--the extent to which the ysb remains as an advocate
of youth in conflicts with parents or authorities
--the extent to which a ysb focuses on coordinating
existing agencies, rather than developing new services
--the extent to which it provides direct services
as opposed to referred services
--the methods used to change existing systems
23
--the extent to which the program uses "detached
workers" to recruit clients from the neighborhoods
(referred to as the extent of "outreach")
--the systems, which are selected as objects of
change
It has been hypothesized that each of these variables will
have an effect on the . role which the youth service bureau
establishes within the juvenile and youth service systems
and thus on the extent to which it fulfills its goals of
diversion, rehabilitation, and prevention.
Preliminary reports on existing programs suggest
that there is a critical need to determine appropriate
values for the above variables. John Seymour, reporting
on a conference on youth service bureaus held in January
of 1971, indicated there was considerable confusion among
the participants about the appropriate role of ysbs in the
pattern of organizations for dealing with youth. Models
of agency operation varied widely along all of the dimen-
sions outlined above, and the agencies assumed widely
different roles within their communities. Many of the
bureaus found their objectives conflicting, and were embroiled
in internal conflicts and conflicts with other agencies.
Before local, state, and federal criminal justice
planners can reasonably make policy decisions with respect
to the implementation of youth service bureaus, at least
three general issues eventually must be resolved: How
feasible and effective are youth service bureaus as a
24
strategy for providing a rehabilitative alternative to
juvenile court? How feasible and effective are youth
service bureaus as a strategy for preventing delinquency
through systems change? How do the constraints imposed
by the juvenile justice and youth service systems, as
well as variables of agency design, affect the success
of operation in each case?
The Study Approach
This study will attempt to shed light on these
issues through an examination of what happens when a
city attempts to implement the youth service bureau as a
comprehensive youth agency with several possibly conflicting
goals. Five areas of questions will be addressed:
1. What role does the ysb establish in the juvenile
justice system?
--What level of referrals is it able to obtain?
--Is it able to circumvent the adjudicatory process?
--Is it accepted by the police and courts?
--For what type of cases does it assume responsibilty?
--Does it avoid stigma?
2. What role does the ysb establish in the youth
service/child welfare system?
--Can it obtain community services?
--Does it coordinate delivery of service to indi-
vidual youths?
--Does it produce changes in other agencies so as
to better meet youth needs?
--Does it create new services in response to youth
needs?
--Does it increase the ability of youth to generate
better services for themselves?
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--What alternative self-definitions does the ysb
create for itself?
3. What are the critical features of (and conflicts
between) these two systems which determine the
ysb's role?
4. What are the internal organizational factors
which are determinazit of its role (e.g., staff
structure, leadership, client participation,
base of operation - detached workers vs. office,
advisory boards, prevention ideology)?
5. What other factors external to the above systems
are critical? In particular, how does the federal,
state and local control structure affect the role
and success of operation of the ysb?
These questions will be addressed in the context
of the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. The Cambridge Youth Resources Board provides
an' excellent model for a case study because of its age and
its prototypical proposal. Now entering its fourth year
of operation, the YRB was one of the earliest youth service
bureaus. Its original proposal responded precisely to
the President's Commission's recommendations, and in its
brief history, the YRB has been involved in the full range
of issues at the heart of the youth service bureau con-
troversy. 21
As with all single case studies, it is difficult to
generalize confidently from the experiences of one agency.
The density of information available in the case study,
however, makes it possible to begin to generalize about
the necessity of particular types of organizations where
26
certain internal conditions or external influences are
present. 22 Thus the richness of empirical date available
in the Cambridge case shouad make it possible to begin
to identify variables and construct models of the systems
and organizational constraints on the roles and fuintions
of youth service bureaus. Future studies comparing
the experiences of other ysbs would make it possible to
develop and test these models.
The comparative work that does exist 23 suggests
that most youth service bureaus have been subject to most of
the problems -- with criminal justice agencies, youth ser-
vice agencies, city administrations, staff, and goal
priorities -- which the Cambridge YRB encountered; even
though different agency design features or idiosynchrosies
of personality have produced very different resolutions of
these problems. The Cambridge YRB was unusually comprehen-
sive and well funded, 24 and had available to it as resources
an unusually large number of social service agencies.
Thus it should have had unusually good prospects for
success. Its outreach component was more highly developed
and aggressive than that of most ysbs, however, which may
have led to an unusually high level of staff conflict and
biased the way in which the agency determined goal priorities.
Otherwise, however, the circumstances facing the Cambridge
YRB were very similar to those which would face any agency
in a city of comparable size, and the Cambridge model was
27
generally consistent with the guidelines for youth
service bureaus established by the President's Crime
Commision and the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency (NCCD).
The primary research technique employed in this
study was the interview, since that appeared to be the
most promising means of obtaining descriptive information
on Cambridge social systems and the process by which the
YRB attempted to establish a place in those systems.2 5
Over sixty-five individuals were interviewed from five
basic groups: YRB staff - present and past; YRB clients,
both youths and parents; juvenile justice system agencies --
police, court and probation; interacting youth service
agencies; administrative control agencies --the City of
Cambridge and the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice. These groups were the
only sources capable of providing answers to the five
areas of questions raised earlier. Semi-structured inter-
views were conducted, in which the interviewee was asked
to respond to a pre-specified set of topics. Interviews
ranged from one to two hours.
Quantitative data was unfortunately scarce, but
such data as did exist in YRB evaluations and quarterly
reports was used to provide information on referrals
from court and police and referrals to and from other
agencies. Some limited observation of YRB activities
was also made to increase personal understanding and
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appreciation and to corroborate findings.
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CHAPTER !II: SETTING AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE CAMBRIDGE
YOUTH RESOURCES BUREAU
Considerable insight into the feasibility of the
youth service bureau strategy can be gained from a close
examination of the setting in which youth service bureaus
must function. Accordingly, Chapter II will have three
purposes: 1) to describe the origins and rationale for the
initial design of the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau,
indicating its basic similarity to the Crime Commission
model as well as its distinctive design features, 2) to set
out the significant actors within the CYRB, the administra-
tive control agencies, the juvenile justice system, and the
youth service system, and indicate their initial expectations,
and 3) in so doing, to begin to identify the internal struc-
tural variables and the systems constraints which criticallly
determine achievement of the ysb goals set out above, i.e.,
court diversion, co-ordinated delivery of remedial services,
and long-range delinquency prevention through youth develop-
ment.
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Original Rationale and Design
The history of the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau
began in the fall of 1967, although it was almost three
years before the fledgling organization opened its doors.
The original idea for a youth service bureau in Cambridge
quite clearly stemmed from the President's Crime Commission
report. Not only did the report provoke the interest of
local politicians, but it was a letter from James Voren-
berg (Executive Director of the Commission), Lloyd Ohlin
(originator of the youth service bureau concept), and
others at the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice which
initiated Cambridge's efforts to establish a local youth
service bureau. John Nelson1, then attached to the Community
Development Section of Cambridge City Government, was assigned
to follow up on the letter, which suggests developing
a proposal to obtain federal funding for a youth service
bureau in Cambridge.
Nelson began meeting with the Harvard group, and the
idea which they outlined emphasized the formal diversion
goal as expressed in the Crime Commission report. At the
same time, however, another group in Cambridge, spearheaded
by Cambridge Corporation 2, was making plans to establish a
year-round, detached field worker program to provide out-
reach counselling and services to anti-social pre-delinquents.
Their efforts grew out of limited previous streetwork pro-
grams aimed at bringing services to those "hard-to-reach-
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youth" who resisted traditional services and disrupted
agency programs. Nelson brought the two groups together
and effected an uneasy political merger. The Cambridge
Corp. group welcomed the formal diversion concept since
they would be able to deal with the individuals in their
own neighborhoods; the Harvard group more reluctantly accepted
the detached worker component, presciently retaining
concerns that this component would make the program too
diffuse. Nonetheless, they were willing to accept the
detached-worker feature as a potentially effective means
of involving non-delinquent youth in the YRB programs, there--
by reducing Bureau stigma.
With the help of both groups, Nelson drew up a single
proposal. The envisioned bureau was to perform two functions:
1) long-range prevention, to be carried out by the detached
neighborhood workers acting as advocates for individual
youth, and 2) rehabilitation for police and court-referred
youth, to be handled by a separate staff prepared to act
more coercively. Both staffs, with the director, would be
responsible for coordinating the delivery of existing ser-
vices to individual youth and for helping "to introduce
needed services that are not currently available".
Also, during this time, Nelson, with the support of
members of the City Council and City Manager's Office, made
the highly critical decision to establish the YRB as a line
city agency, with the director immediately responsible to
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responsibility of the city. Consequently, Nelson opted for
a public agency, hoping that the Advisory Board, comprised
of community people and a few political allies, such as a
former councilman and a judge, would help the YRB to resist
certain city pressures.
A cooperative City Council approved Nelson's proposal,
which was submitted to the Governor's Committee on Law En-
forcement in the summer of 1969. The council later created
the YRB by executive order and voted it.a first year supple-
mentary appropriation of forty thousand dollars.
While Cambridge was thus engaged in developing a model,
the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement 5 was also taking
action to promote the development of youth service bureaus.
The staff adopted the idea from the President's Crime Commis-
sion and the standards and guidelines subsequently prepared
by the California Youth Authority and the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency. According to one staff member,
"we had a very naive simplistic view of it then. It sounded
good, and we thought we ought to try it in Massachusetts."
Consequently, in 1969, the Committee circulated a prospectus
(patterned after the Crime Commission guidelines) requesting
proposals for "Youth Resources Bureas" to serve delinquents
and pre- delinquents and act as a central agency for dealing
with youth problems. Because of their own uncertainty about
appropriate models, the Committee encouraged experimentation.
Thus, Cambridge's detached worker feature had a particular
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appeal to the Committee staff. Prior to final approval
of the Cambridge proposal, however, the Committee made the
critical decision to delete from the proposal a provision
which would have allowed the Bureau to refer unmanageable
cases back to the court after a 30 or 60 day trial period.
This decision constituted a departure from the Crime Com-
mission's recommendations, and Nelson and others in Cambridge
feared that it would "turn off" the police and courts from
using the YRB. The Committee concurred with NCCD however
in maintaining that the provision would make the Bureau too
stigmatizing and coercive. This decision, along with the
decision to establish a public agency, was to be of paramount
importance in shaping the future of the CYRB.
At the time that funding was officially approved in
early 1970, the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau appeared
to have excellent prospects of success. Nelson had spent
considerable time talking to and securing support from
representatives of the police, the courts, and city and
private agencies, so that, as a former Cambridge agency
worker put it, "everyone was waiting with bated breath" for
the arrival of the new agency. The Chief of Police wrote
that, "Of all the 1969 law enforcement action projects for
which Cambridge is eligible, we would give top priority to
this proposal." The City Manager also gave the YRB "top
priority" and the funding proposal was also officially
endorsed by the Cambridge District Court and over 20 public
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and private agencies. 6
The same agency worker quoted above also indicated,
however, that everyone was not quite sure of just what it
was they were waiting for. In fact, interviews conducted
with many of those who originally endorsed the proposal
revealed a multitude of diverse and often conflicting
expectations. The apparent coalition of enthusiastic
support was in reality a rather fragile confederation of
self-interests.
Nelson, as principal designer of the YRB, anticipated
that court diversion would be the dominant role of the
agency, and his greatest fear was that the Bureau would be
so overwhelmed with the day-to-day processing of police and
court referrals that it would lose sight of its long-range
prevention goal. (The 1969 proposal estimates that the
police and courts would wish to refer about 210 youth each
year.) He was also concerned that the field workers not
become too extended for fear they would stray too far from
serving youth in "serious trouble".7 He hoped that "case-
work with individuals would lead to a recognition of common
problems and lack of resources and then the YRB would ini-
tiate change." They would not take on the new functions
themselves, because "if they adopted the actual functions,
who would be the agitator ?" In order to protect against
the YRB losing sight of its program development and systems
change role, Nelson helped secure a grant from the President's
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Youth Opportunity Council to pay for a separate person,
who would have no caseload, but would work with the Board,
the kids, and agencies to develop needed programs.
Nelson's conception was not shared by many other
agencies in Cambridge, however; and it would not be accurate
to say that it represented the city's view. The City
Councilors certainly had a range of expectations; further-
more there was a massive change in executive city personnel
immediately after the hiring of the YRB's director, with
Nelson, and most of the city administration personnel which
supported the original proposal, leaving Cambridge government.
Police Expectations
Interviews with police revealed that although the
head of the juvenile bureau was in favor of the idea of the
YRB, he saw the Bureau more as a social work resource which
could help relieve police of the burden of dealing with time-
consuming, non-criminal cases which were brought to their
attention. Several policemen were apparently at least a
little suspicious of the prospective new agency, for as one
commented, "Maybe in California or someplace they're used to
this, but the whole idea was pretty new around here!" There
were apparently three functions which the police expected
the new YRB might serve for them: 1) to relieve them of the
burden of dealing with the least serious cases. Many cases
which involved personal, family, neighborhood, or school
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problems were normally handled by "station adjustment". --
a Saturday morning conference consisting of a lecture on
some sort of settlement. These cases usually did not
warrant arrest, but were time-consuming; and policemen
often felt inadequate to resolve the problems they presented.
The existence of a Youth Resources Bureau would enable them
to refer these cases to someone else who could take responsi-
bility for follow-up. As one lieutenant put it, "When
there was a runaway, and the parents complain they have no
control over the kid,... at least we could tell them there
was someplace to go." An officer from the narcotics unit
indicated that he had intended to send every marijuana
smoker to the YRB. 2) to help the police deal with their
most recurrent offenders. With these cases, in addition to
taking the youth to court, the police wanted to be able to
call the YRB to provide counseling or other professional
help to keep the individual from continually repeating his
crime. The processing of cases of continual repeaters
(especially where severe psychological or social problems
were involved) were ale time-consuming and particularly
frustrating for the police. 3) to assist the police in
penetrating high crime areas. Some of the policemen apparently
hoped that the detached workers would act in some situations
as an extended arm of the police, helping to maintain order
and aiding detectives. Notably absent from this list, an-
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trary to the intent of the original designers, is the intent
to use the YRB as an alternative to taking youth to court.
Court Expectations
Court personnel viewed the YRB from an entirely differ-
ent perspective. One of the judges of the Cambridge court
explained it this way, "Well, yes, I was on the original
task force, but I was mostly a front man, you know. We took
the idea right out of the Crime Commission report. 'Diversion'
was a pizazz word then, and it had selling power. I put my
name on it along with Vorenberg and the others. It was a way
of getting more resources for the court... Diversion is over-
rated in my opinion. The main thing is to have the most
resources you can so that somebody is always paying attention
to the cases." [emphasis added) A probation office confirmed
the desire to use the new YRB as a probation resource. "Yeah,
I expected the YRB to do pretty much the same thing as proba-
tion staff, only they could be more thorough because of the
smaller caseload." Staff also hoped that the YRB could be
"a sort of central clearingzhouse", a link from the probation
staff to the staff and resources of outside programs. Thus
the intent of the court, again contrary to the original pur-
pose, was apparently natj to cede responsibility for less
serious cases to the YRB, but rather to use the YRB as an
additional resource for its grossly overworked probation
staff.
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Expectations of the Youth Service Agencies
The endorsing social agencies, meanwhile, had an
entirely different set of interests in the YRB. It is
difficult to determine their expectations precisely,
because of the wide range of agencies and the considerable
staff turnovers which have occured since 1969. Although
there was general enthusiasm, there was also considerable
uncertainty. Agency executives professed a predominant
"wait and see" attitude, but were able to indicate some of
the following hopes and fears:
1) A few predominantly new agencies with similar target
populations hoped that the YRB workers would be able to
help them to begin to identify potential clients.
2) Several hoped that the YRB, as general delinquency
experts, would be able to help them with their trouble-
some cases. This help could be in the form of consulta-
tion or outright referral. A Recreation Department offi-
cial expressed his expectations as: "If we were having
trouble with a youngster in one of our facilities,...
Or, if there was vandalism at one of our centers (vandal-
ism is a large cost to us every year) and we thought we
knew who was doing it, then.., the YRB could go in and
do the job of the police department -- see if our assump-
tions were right, and try to get the youngsters back on
the straight road.... They could have been a turn-off in
the right direction, short of having to call the police."
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3) Several of the private agencies hoped that the new YRB
might "transcend usual agency boundaries" by helping
them to coordinate competing programs and make better
use of each other's resources.
4) They also hoped that the YRB might make available addi-
tional personnel and funds that would help them develop
new programs, and
5) They thought the YRB, as a city agency, might give them
"a direct pipeline to the City Manager", but
6) The agencies were also quite cautious and anxious about
whether or not the new agency had any better answers than
they had. The public agencies were particularly uneasy,
since the YRB could become a competitor for funds and
the right to control services;to some extent, its very
existence was an indictment that, as one city politician
put it, "somehow, the School Department and the Recreation
Department just weren't doing the job."
Thus, the youth service agencies presented a range of expec-
tations (differing according to whether the agency was public
or private, and whether or not it was concerned with the
same target population) which suggested both reasons for
cooperation and reasons for resistance to YR3 goals.
Initial Expectations of the YRB Administration
It was in the midst of these conflicting expectations
that the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau officially 'eame
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into being in June of 1970. The recently appointed director
was from Chicago and had had little contact with the group
which prepared the original proposal and approved his hiring.
Initially, however, he set out to establish the Bureau
according to the proposal guidelines.
It is clear from interviews and a Bureau report
appearing in February 1971 that the original priority of the
YRB administration was to establish themselves as a referral
agency, with the police and courts providing the bulk of
their caseload. A former administrative staff member recalled,
"The original idea was to be a referral agency. The target
population would be delinquents, pre-delinquents, generally
troublesome or unmanageable kids. The YRB would be an advo-
cate for the kids; it wouldn't provide direct treatment,
but it would evaluate and refer. The idea was that it would
not be labelling. We wouldn't say 'yQA have a problem', but
rather 'there is a problem; what can we do about it ?'...
And then, they'd (YRB) provide consultation to programs
around on how to relate to kids that were causing them
trouble." The February report estimates that 68% of YRB
staff time would be occupied with police referrals, and 20%
with court referrals, with neighborhood outreach wort pre-
sumably consuming most of the rest. Initially it was con-
ceived that professional counselors would back up the non-
professional streetworkers, who would establish "trust
relationships" and provide neighborhood expertise.
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The referral model was the primary focus in early
planning, but the director and his staff were interested in
exploring a variety of approaches to youth problems. Staff
members got the impression that the new agency would be
"very flexible and very active", and that the concepts of
youth adv6cacy and social change would be integrally related
to the referral model. At least rhetorically, the Bureau
seemed to want to take all of its charges seriously -- but
as will be explained presently, doing so was to bring them
into sharp conflict with juvenile justice agency expectations,
with serious implications for the effort to establish a
referral agency.
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CHAPTER II
FOOTNOTES
1. Since Nelson had only recently joined the city
administration, and spent only a brief time in
that position, there seems to be little reason
to assume that he had any hidden ulterior motives
in designing the YRB.
2. A local, non-profit United Fund agency.
3. Cambridge has a City Manager type of local govern-
ment. The Manager is appointed by the City Council
for an indefinite term. Although the Mayor and the
City Council have general responsibility for setting
policy, implementation is entirely the responsibility
of the City Manager.
4. As opposed to amending the City Charter, and thereby
establishing the YRB as a more permanent City Depart-
ment. This step left the City with the option of
simply discontinuing the Bureau, if desired, if and
when Federal funding elapsed.
5. The Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement is the
State criminal justice planning- agency, which-is
responsible for distributiig Federal'Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds in Massachu-
setts. 70% of these funds must be channeled
through local units of government.
CHAPTER III: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM --
WALKED OUT OR LOCKED OUT ?
In the course of its brief history, the Cambridge
YRB has undergone a considerable shift in goal priorities --
moving away from the formal -diversion goal of providing
a services alternative to juvenile court and toward "systemic
change" of "systems relevant to youth". The announcement
that "priorities have shifted" first appeared-in an October
1971 funding proposal, and by the end of 1972, the director
stated that "police and court referrals are no longer a
significant part of our program plan."
This chapter will trace the development of pressures
generated by the YRB structure, by the Youth Service and
Criminal Justice Systems, and by the State funding source
which led to both considerable internal goal confusion and
the eventual failure of the diversion-referral model. The
chapter will also examine the Bureau's early struggles to
redefine its goals, and attempt to explain why, at least a
rhetorical commitment was made to a systems change goal.
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Inside the YRB - Initial Problems
Staff Composition and Structure
In order to fulfill its mandate to perform a variety
of functions ranging from streetwork and community organi-
zing to professional counselling to agency coordination
and program development, the YRB required a staff with di-
verse capabilities. About half of the staff that was ini-
tially hired were professionals, with bachelors degrees or
better, generally with some training in social work or
psychology. Part of this staff was hired, according to the
Director and other staff, to provide diagnoses, evaluate
referred cases, and to back up non-professional outreach
workers; and a part of this staff was hired to carry out
agency coordination and program development aimed at long-
range prevention through expanded youth opportunities.
The non-professional staff was comprised primarily of
local residents who had considerable experience as community
street workers. Some of them had police records; most of
them had little or no college education. They were largely
local representatives of ethnic Cambridge communities whose
role it was to penetrate those communities and establish
the "trust relationships" with youth that would facilitate
voluntary acceptance of outreach and referred services and
voluntary participation in local program development. A
few sympathetic Court officials supported the director in
his effort to gain City approval for some of these hirings,
because, as one judge put it, a "worker like Jack Tyson
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[a particularly charismatic and effective street-worker with
a police record, according to the YRB director and several
youths] could make or break a new program like that." The
director further clarified his reasons for hiring non-pro-
fessionals and "long-hair types" with a heavy street-work
orientation.
The YRB had its origin in a time of considerable
political turmoil -- war protests, Kent State --
and the street scene was very big. Street kids were
becoming very politically aware and were hanging
around places like Harvard Square because of the
political activity, the street scene, and the
drugs. Youth-police and youth-establishment ten-
sions were running very high... If we were going
to be a voluntary organization, we needed to have
workers who could communicate with the kids, who
the kids would trust.
After staff was hired, the YRB began operation with
a very loose and flexible structure, but with the role of
administrative and line (or service) staff fairly well
differentiated. Administrative Staff (the Director and the
Program Coordinator, and later the Assistant Director)
primarily directed their activity at other Cambridge agencies.
The director began meeting with the police, the courts, the
City Council, the City Manager, the many social agencies,
the Governor's Committee, etc, in order to get the program
set up internally and to establish the relationships and
agreements that would bring referrals in and make referrals
out possible. Supposedly, the director was also to have
done some casework, but as the YRB 1971 funding proprosal
states, "Experience has proven that a great deal of the
Director's time is spent developing inter-personal relation-
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ships with community leaders."'
The rest of the staff, on the other hand, in sharp
contrast to the administration, had little official con-
tact with the agencies. The formal referral model took
time to negotiate and establish, and in the interim, the
staff was dispatched to establish the detached worker
model. At least for some of the staff workers, this street
activity was quite natural, and the Bureau was able to
set this model into motion very quickly. Three teams of
2 to 3 workers were formed, each containing professionals
and non-professionals, and each working with the youth in
a particular high-crime area of the city. They began
talking with youths and local community leaders about local
youth problems, and began informal counseling and crisis
intervention. In order to be effective in averting crises,
the Bureau decided to establish a 24-hour on-call policy
since most juvenile activity and crime took place, according
to police records, between 3 P.M. and 1.A.M. Workers tried
to keep their kids out of trouble, and the kids began to
come to workers with their problems -- a family problem, a
drug overdose, a school problem, a job problem, an attempted
suicide, etc. As trust relationships developed (as one girl
from Jefferson Park put it, "They were the first adults we'd
ever met that we could talk to -- it was really different."),
youths also began to "drop in" at the YRB to "rap" with the
street workers.
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The need to Perform a wide variety of functions
created confusion over appropriate staff roles and gener-
ated considerable tension between professionals and non-
professional staff. "Patty Jones [a Ph.D. psychologist]
for example", said one former YRB worker, "had a hell of
a time figuring out whether she was supposed to be in the
office diagnosing and counseling referred kids or out on
the wall in Roosevelt Towers [a housing project hang-out].
Their roles weren't clear -- they weren't 'social-worker'
or 'clinician' or 'teacher'. All the traditional roles were
wiped out. That was part of what the agency was supposed
to be all about...but it led to confusion, confusion led to
frustration, and frustration led to anger and disorder."
The "expertise" of professionals was challenged by the street-
knowledge of the non-professionals. For example, the Bureau
had set a policy on police and court referrals of waiting
10 days for the youth to contact the YRB, in order to allow
the opportunity for voluntary contact (thus reducing stigma)
before a YRB outreach worker Would contact the youth in his
neighborhood. The YRB had planned that the non-professional
outreach worker would then turn the case over to the super-
vision of the professional on that team, who would be respon-
sible for final diagnosis and referral. Both youth and non-
professional staff often objected to this approach however,
and finally it was decided, in a full staff meeting, to
allow non-professionals full responsibility for those cases
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where they had established "trust relationships" with a
youth.
Non-professionals, on the other hand, sometimes had
problems seeing beyond a street-work, crisis intervention
perspective. Some of them had difficulty interacting with
court or police or agency personnel who many of them mis-
trusted, or they lacked interest in the program and service
development aspect of the Bureau's mandate. They sometimes
felt inferior, or overwhelmed by professional jargon. One
such worker had to be fired early in the Bureau's history
because of his conflicts with other staff and his inability
to internalize long-range YRB gbals.
In response to these tensions, staff roles became
more highly differentiated according to the skills and
inclinations of staff members. Non-professionals tended to
dominate street and neighborhood work, with a few of the
younger, less highly trained professionals also shifting
primarily into the neighborhood worker role. Professionals
tended to either move into the role of consultant on police
and court referral cases or into administrative or program
development roles. One effect of this increased differentia-
tion of functions was to widen the separation between admin-
istrative staff (who were primarily absorbed in office-
based work and interagency meetings) and line (or service)
staff (who were primarily involved in neighborhood work).
This separation bred mistrust, particularly on the part of
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line staff, who began to question the director's ability to
appreciate and deal with daily youth problems. Both staffs
became increasingly concerned about how the other was re-
presenting the YRB to outside parties.
Imolementation Problems -- The Youth Service System
As referrals from the police and courts began to
come in, the staff encountered several practical problems
in attempting to implement the referral model. In attempt-
ing to resolve these problems, the staff was forced to make
some hard choices about the role which the Bureau was to
assume xig. a yjz clients. They were forced to determine
the extent to which the YRB would act as advocates for
youth in those situations when their needs conflicted with
the needs of existing social institutions. These conflicts
arose in the course of two processes: 1) trying to obtain
social services for their clients, and 2) determining
appropriate courses of action for police and court referred
cases.
The YRB quickly encountered tremendous practical
difficulties in their attempts to coordinate the delivery
of services to referred youths. They discovered that it
was impossible to retain a model of brief YRB contact for
evaluation and then referral, because: 1) many of the
services that were diagnosed as needed simply were not
available, 2) many of the services that did exist were in-
adequate or inappropriate for their youth, 3) some of the
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service agencies, particularly those with competing views
of the service network, tended to reject or somehow screen
out the type of Otroublemaking" youth the YRB was likely to
refer, and 4) YRB workers usually found it was impossible
to sever relationships with youths after referrals were
made. Each of these four problems are discussed in turn.
The first observation is fairly straightforward. As
a consultant to the YRB commented, "You couldn't send the
kid to an alternative school that didn't exist or have him
work half a day if there was no work-study program."
With respect to the second problem, the same consul-
tant observed that, "part of the irony of the YRB idea was
that you had to refer the kids back to the same agencies
that had failed them in the first place." Part of the ra-
tionale cited for creating youth service bureaus with para-
professionals, youth participation, and a community base,
was the failure of traditional social work agencies to deal
effectively with delinquency. Yet it was the same agencies,
the consultant explained, " with their traditional methods
and allegiances, their caseload hang-ups, their rules and
red tape" that the YRB found itself forced to turn to for
many of the services it required for its clients. The YRB
director related that "many times the kids had been through
those agencies already, and they'd had it. They [the agencies]
were completely out of step with the times -- they'd have
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one 60 year old woman there to deal with 16 year olds.
...The psychiatric agencies, family counseling, home place--
ments -- those agencies couldn't produce. I remember one
time it took eight months for them to get a kid placed in
another home, even though he'd been thrown out on the street
and absolutely everyone agreed he should be placed immediately."
Frequently the YRB was distraught with the way tradi-
tional agencies treated their clients, and increasingly they
began to turn to less traditional agencies -- the poverty
law office, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, Education Ware-
house (tutoring and equivalency diplomas), Group School (a
new alternative school), Cambridgeport Problem Center, etc.
The agencies to which the YRB most often referred
clients were those agencies who had what Martin Rein has
termed "a humanitarian view of the service network", i.e.,
those agencies which saw their function as enabling "a
helpless and deprived population...to win access to Chereto-
fore inaccessible]social institutions."2 Rein suggests four
competing views: 1) "the network may be viewed as a produc-
tiona-delivery system where cAstmers purchase a product
...dispensed by a professional acting as a salesman or inter-
mediary" (e.g., recreation, group work services), 2) "the
service network may be seen as a helping process aimed
chiefly at the malfunctioning individual" (client or patient),
3) "the network may be seen largely in terms of social
control -- to bring the deviant...to adopt more conforming
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behavior.", and 4) "the service network might be viewed as
...serving a helpless and deprived population...enabling the
victim to win access to social institutions which hereto-
fore were inaccessible to him." In its advocacy role of
securing needed and deserved services for youth, the YRB
increasingly adopted this fourth view; and eventually most
of their referrals went to agencies such as alternative
schools, NYC, etc. which shared this view, whereas agencies
(such as the City hospital, Family Counseling, etc.) which
viewed their clients as "patients" or "deviants", were less
likely to receive (or accept) YRB referrals. As will be
seen later, these agencies were also less likely to resist
referring clients to the YRB, typically complaining that
they found the YRB insufficiently professional, structured,
and/or authoritarian.
The third type of problem which the YRB encountered
in attempting to secure referral services stemmed from what
Cloward and others have termed the "creaming" phenomengn,
whereby agencies tend to screen out those clients who most
need their services, preferring to work with those who are
most likely to result in agency successes.3 Because of the
nature of their clients, the YRB found many agencies un-
willing to accept them. The Director of the YHB indicated
that YRB's association with the police and courts and their
appearance on the streets gave them a reputation very early
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as an agency that worked with "bad" kids, and several
agencies refused to redefine their intake priorities,
claiming "YRB-type kids are untreatable". A former
employee of a local employment service, for example,
revealed that he had been advised by his supervisor "not
to work with kids who are going to be in trouble", because
"you know the kid won't stay on the job and there's no
sense getting in trouble with the employer." Conflicts
consequently resulted in some of these cases when the YRB
made serious attempts to carry out its mandate of acting
as a advocate for its clients in securing needed services
and of modifying services so as to make them more relevant
to the needs of youth.
There were at least two reasons given by consultants
and staff for the fourth problem of severing relationships.
In the first place, it took considerable time to work out
agency problems and get the youth the services he needed.
Considerable time-consuming follow-up was involved, that
might involve several trips to the school, a job placement
agency, an employer, as well as support counseling and
arranging transportation with the youth. In the second place,
after working hard to gain the trust and confidence of a
youth, workers began to feel committed to that youth, es-
pecially when no easy answer to his problem could be found,
and the worker continued to see the youth as part of his
neighborhood work.
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All of this is not to say that the YRB was completely
unsuccessful in fulfilling the role of coordinating service
delivery to youth in trouble with the law. They did get
considerable cooperation from a larger number of agencies --
from the Child Guidance Clinic to the Recreation Department
to the Group School in agreeing to accept YRB referred
clients. The YRB does now refer many youth to less tradi-
tonal agencies, and probably could refer more to traditional
agenciesif it were so inclined. The Assistant Director of
the Child Guidance Clinic commented that the discontinua-
tion of referrals from the YRB was "more a matter of their
choice than our assistance." Furthermore, there is some
evidence that the agencies also would have accepted the
YRB's role in fostering cooperation between the agencies
and the courts and police, and perhaps coordinating future
service development. For example, in March of 1971, the
YRB sponsored a half-day conference for major public and
private institutions involved with youth before the courts.
According to Jane Brent, who planned the conference for the
YRB, the conference was designed to ameliorate communica-
tion problems between the Probation Department and other
community agencies dealing with youth. The staffs of ten
agencies attended, including the Probation Department, the
Police Department and School Department. The meeting was
eminently successful, according to Ms. Brent and other
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participants, as careful group dynamics preparation led
to a significant exchange of information and the development
of trust and valuable interpersonal contrabts between agen-
cies. A second meeting held in June 1971 was also fairly
successful in bringing the agencies together to discuss
plans to coordinate efforts to deal with specific youth
problems, especially school-related problems.
The problems they encountered did mean, however,
that if the YRB was going to fulfill its mandate of securing
for its youth the appropriate and needed services, then
they had essentially three, not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive, alternatives: 1) they could provide the services
directly themselves. Direct service delivery was specifi-
cally a pitfall which youth service bureaus were supposed
to avQid, but at least to some extent, it seemed an inevi-
table function if the YRB was not to completely abandon its
clients when existing agencies could not meet their needs.
2) they could work on modifying the nature and method of
delivery of services currently: being provided by existing
agencies. This function was specifically a part of their
mandate, but it also entailed the risk of offending and
threatening agencies, and thus jeopardizing any further
relations, and 3) they could concentrate on stimulating
and assisting new or current groups to develop new types
of services. This function was also a part of the YRB
mandate.
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In practice all three of these things began to occur
in spontaneous reaction to the agency referral problems
that arose. Street-workers began to provide such direct
services to their youth as pregnancy counseling, driver
training, job-finding assistance, tutoring, etc. Others,
especially those with more professional backgrounds,
argued that direct services were too short-sighted, and
did not change the basic problem of a lack of services;
they tended to concentrate on developing new programs.
Others found themselves attacking uncooperative and un-
responsive agencies (sometimes charging racism and/or, as
with the schools, attacking them publicly on television) or,
in the case of administrative staff, working with the 1
agency's head to encourage changes or develop proposals
for new programs.
All of this activity tended to generate further
confusion over appropriate staff roles. Staff had trouble
deriving job satisfaction because there were no clear stan-
dards for success. As Tony, a former worker reflected,
The staff began to have problems working together.
They were competing, threatened by each other's
work. If one was successful, the others felt
threatened...So whatever was successful came to
be defined as the right thing to do. We went
from one crisis to the next with the standards
always changing. When the Jefferson Park project
(a model teen center, delinquency prevention
project initiated by a YRB staff member in co-
operation with community organizations) began
and was new, it had high status and that was the
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type of thing we should be doing. When it began
to encounter delays and difficulties, subjectve
evaluations changed, disillusionment set in, and
something else became the thing to do. There
were always tremendous swings.
Thus the issue of how to respond to problems with the
youth service agencies was a source of considerable staff
controversy.
Implementation Problems -- The Criminal Justice System
The second major dilemna which confronted staff in
their attempt to establish the referral model was the
issue of how to handle cases referred by the police and
courts. Much of the line staff insisted on the need to
maintain complete confidentiality on these cases, and
several were reluctant to handle them. In their neigh-
borhood work, the staff expended their energies trying
to win the trust and confidence of youth so that: 1) police
and court referred youth would voluntarily cooperate with
the YRB in resolving their cases, 2) other "potentially
delinquent" youth would voluntarily seek out their services,
thus not only making the YRB effective in preventing them
from future delinquency, but also giving the YRB some non-
labelled clientele, thereby reducing the stigma associated
with the YRB, and 3) they would have a constituency who
would actively participate in YRB program development
efforts, and inform and support their efforts at changing
systems so as to increase youth opportu*ities and prevent
future delinquency.
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Interviews with youth suggested that to build these
relationships, YRB workers had to be able to do two things.
First, they had to be able to deliver a real service. Cam-
bridge has a long history of short-lived social agencies,
and Cambridge youth are agency-wary. Thus, trust could be
built up only if"that YRB worker was there when you really
needed him" and " came through with that job he promised"
or "with his promise to get you back in school." Secondly,
the worker had to make it clear that he was on the youth's
side. Youth praised workers who they could trust "all the
way" and criticized a worker because "you hardly ever see
him down here on the streets, and when he comes around, he
wants to play ball with you. He slaps you on the back and
tells you to do this and do that and you'll be all right.
He's like your fucking mother!!...Nah, I don't trust him.
Everybody's on to his game." YRB staff workers all reported
being continually tested by their kids. "Kids were confused
on how the YRB related to the law", one worker reported.
"They'd test you to see how much they could trust you. It
was like they were asking you, 'Will you turn me in ? Are
you on my side, or are you just like everyone else ? What
limits will you set on me ?' They forced you to take sides."
"It was tough with the court referrals", reported another.
"The kids could identify YRB with the court and the cops --
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they'd figure, "These people are here to punish me' so
they'd try to hustle you, rip you off like everyone else..,
I think kids saw me as being on their side; with some of
the others, I think the kids saw them as being on the cops'
side." Furthermore, some of the staff had inherent dis-
trust of police because of their own previous experiences.
The director and the administrative staff, on the
other hand, had spent considerable effort trying to main-
tain good relations with the police and courte so that
referrals would be forthcoming. The director was particu-
larly sensitive to the fact that the successful establish-
ment of the referral model could determine the YRB's future
funding. The Governor's Committee and the city would want
statistics on police and court referrals, and he had to
consider how Bureau policies would affect the level of
those referrals.
Much internal debate and heated argument resulted as
workers began to handle referrals, often taking the youth's
side, and the administrative staff tried to maintain good
relations with the police and the court. The issue of
how to balance youth advocacy with responsibility to the
juvenile justice system was never fully resolved internally
(either for the staff or for many youth), but police and
court reactions soon made the issue moot.
External Resistance -- The Police
Given the police department's expectations of the
YRB, it is not surprising that relations initially came
to a cordial stalement and soon progressed to open con-
flict. In the early negogiations, the police steadfastly
refused to circumvent the court, and the YRB just as
determinedly refused to accept referrals of "hard-cores"'
Both issues were pointsof contention. Finally it was
agreed that beginning in February 1971, the YRB would
accept referrals of all cases which would normally require
station adjustment. The YRB was dissatisfied in that
these referrals did not involve real court diversion (they
were primarily cases where the complainant dropped charges),
but they encountered firm resistance to their attempts to
gain referrals of more serious cases. The lieutenant in
charge of the Juvenile Bureau made it clear that he believed
the police guidelines gave them almost no discretion to
refer youths to the YRB. "They couldn't change our pattern
too much", he reflected. "We're very limited in what we
can do; once an arrest is made, we must go to court. There's
nothing we can do about that." And since they defined an
arrest very technically as any stoppage of free movement of
a suspect, and since the lieutenant insisted that all YRB
referrals be made through his office (as opposed to through
individual officers) for record-keeping, there did not seem
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to be any leeway. Consequently, for fear of intimidation,
the YRB relented, hoping to be able to broaden referral
guidelines once their credibility was established.
On the other hand, the police were somewhat per-
turbed that the YRB refused to accept referrals of repeated
serious offenders who were being sent to court. Not only
were these youths outside of the official YRB target popu-
lation, but also no diversion from court was involved.
Many policemen felt, however, that they could handle the
minor cases as well as anyone, and that their "hard-cores"
were the only ones who really needed outside help. As the
lieutenant commented, "we run into some trouble on that issue";
but for the most part, official and personal relations re-
mained cordial. The head of the Juvenile Bureau served on
the YRB Advisory Board and there were occasional meetings
of administrative staffs. Referrals were handled informally
by phone.
Like the calm before the storm, the initial peace
did not last long. Several referrals were made- in the be-
ginning, but the volume slowed as resentment and conflict
developed. To some extent, the very existence of a YRB was
an indictment of the job being done by the police department,
since it inferred that present police treatment of youth
was inadequate or inappropriate. Police resentment was'
reflected in remarks like, "I'll tell you something, the
closest rapport of delinquents is with cops. Many repeaters
...understand us, they feel close to us...If they need a
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driver's license or a job, they come to U&. We try to
help them...But they (the YRB) didn't refer anyone to jAgL."
or "I don't know if they're effective. I know juvenile
arrests kept going up. I know that."
The 'looseness" of the YRB structure, their lack of
authority and their close identification with youth were
also particularly disturbing to police officers, making
them hesitant to make referrals. "I don't know what
they do with a kid once he's referred there," one remarked.
A sergeant expressed his suspicions about the staff's com-
petence, "YRB is too unofficial...They're out there drink-
ing wine with the kids and everything." (In fact, several
times YRB workers were almost arrested while working with
gangs late at night.) "I'll give you an example", he con-
tinued.
We have a plain-clothes liason officer at the school,
and the kids respect him because he's a big, black
man...well, let's say we see a kid who's supposed
to be in school, and we see him hanging around MIT
or Harvard Square, and we think he's fleecing cars,
but we don't have anything on him -- that's the type
of case we might refer to YRB, right -- well, we'd
just call Herbie (the liason officer) instead...
and he'll grab the kid next time he sees him and
he'll straighten him out -- and we won't see the
kid hanging out around MIT anymore either."
The police wanted assurance that visible corrective action
was being taken.
But most of the police's strong reaction to questions
about the YRB stemmed from their perception that their roles
were entirely different, a perception that many YRB staff
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workers also came to share. In trying to carry out their
mandate to act as advocates for youth, YRB street-workers
often found themselves in conflict with the police. As
one former worker summed it up, "Having good relations
with the cops is the antithesis of successful work with
kids...Cops rrotect. the society from kids,; the YRB is to
protect kids from the society."
Theradveooay role of the YRB led to numerous incidents
which drew harsh responses from police officers. For
example, "I don't get along with them at all," reported a
sergeant from the Juvenile Bureau, "they've gotten too
involved in my cases." He proceeded to relate an incident
in which he had three youths up on a charge of mayhem, a
serious felony, when,
I there's the YRB trying to assist the defendants
and telling My key witness she better get a lawyer
or she would be charged. Well, I was screaming
mad. I threatened to go to the D.A. and bring them
up for intimidating a witness. Oh. there was a big
stir, all right, and they apologized all over the
place; but, Jesus, they got no business interfering
in my cases like that!
Several times the police tried to enlist YRB aid in solving
cases or restoring order. In fact, the only positive
comment the sergeant could make about the YRB was that one
of the workers had helped his squad in that respect several
times. ("He stopped a full-scale race riot where no one else
could have done iti") But cooperation was not always forth-
coming. The sergeant told of another incident where a youth
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escaped from prison with a gun, and the youth's YRB
worker refused to bring-him in, even though "he could
have come up with him." YRB workers, of course, saw the
same problem from the other side.
A cop called me late at night and asked me to come
down to the station right away and help talk a kid
into signing a confession so they could send him
away. The kid was elevent I came down all right,
with a lawyer for the kid!
Numerous incidents such as these, stemming from very
different views of the client population, cost the YRB the
trust of many police officers, as did other aspects of the
Bureau's non-coercive policy of working with youth, volun-
tarily toward the solution of their problems. The issue of
follow-up and police control on referred cases, for example,
was a source of police grievances. "Police like to get
information, and they (the YRB) didn't want a reputation as
informers, so there were some problems", explained a police
lieutenant.
When we sent them a case, we wanted some follow-up.
We expected it. But when we'd ask, we'd get little
information, and they'd never tell you anything de-
trimental; they wouldn't tell you that he's out
stealing cars again.
He underscored the separateness of the two agencies with,
They didn't want to be affliated with the police.
(I can understand that; they need to have the kids
trust them.) They consider themselves a social
agency, not an enforcement agency. Their office
is up at 930 Mass. Avenue, you know, not down here.
The YRB's style of operation, their loose structure,
and their mandate for non-coercion and youth advocacy
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eventually completely compromised the Bureau's ability
to function as a referral resource for the police. "There
are no referrals now," reported the sergeant in the Juve-
nile Bureau. "The YRB is a social agencv: there's no need
to refer cases to them. We can take care of things better
ourselves. The sergeant steers the group, and that's the
way I feel about it...and I think the rest of them would a-
gree." Lemphasis added] A few personal relationships bet-
ween individual policemen and YRB streetworkers remain
solid, resulting in occasional personal informal referral,
and there has been some cooperation in times of crisis,
but for all practical purposes, police referrals are now
quite non-existent.
External Resistance -- The Court and Probation
The failures of police referrals made court referrals
absolutely cardinal to the success of the YRB as a formal
diversion program. Yet, despite Bureau efforts, the court
never became a significant source of referrals, and, in fact,
referrals came to a virtual halt when the court, in October
1971 opted to establish its own diversion program, the
Model Juvenile Probation (or Intake) Program.
Initially, relations between the two agencies developed
slowly, but cordially. By February 1971 initial referral
guidelines had been agreed upon, with the Bureau once again
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finding itself compromised, for the guidelines clearly
reflected the court's intention of using the YRB as a
probation staff resource.After much negogiation, three
categories were agreed upon for referral: 1) Cases "continued
without a finding", which are cases where a decision on
adjudication is delayed, usually one year, after which time
the case is dismissed if there are no further violations.
This was the usual disposition on relatively minor first
offenses. 2) Recidivist cases (those where an offense is
repeated) whose initial disposition was "continued without
a finding". (According to court personnel, these offenders
usually were placed on probation), and 3) all first offender
"use of motor vehicle without authority" cases (normally
disposed of by "continued without a finding", probation,
or a suspended sentence, depending on circumstances and
social background).
It is significant that this arrangement lacked the
most salient feature of diversion: avoidance of official
labeling and avoidance of the stigma of the court process.
For all of the above cases, the judge would handle the case
in the same manner as before; as is usual in juvenile court,
the probation staff would maintain official responsibility
for the case, but would refer the youth and family to the
YRB, whose services they were free to accept or reject.
The completely voluntary nature of the YRB's service made
court officials extremely reluctant to surrender control of
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a case to them. This reluctance is clearly illustrated in
the following language from the referral guidelines explain-
ing the courts' refusal to refer "stubborn child" cases
(a juvenile offense based on parental complaint):
...The authority of the court (e.g. Court Clinic
involvement) seems to be necessary for the family
to make use of an available resource. Taking the
decision-making power out of the hands of the
fasily, which is antithetical to the Youth Re-
sources Bureau's emphasis on self-determination,
has been identified as critical in enabling
these families to accept services. It may be
that a non-coercive agency, such as Youth Re-
sources Bureau, is incapable of giving the family
the structuring it appears to need to deal with
its problem (emphasis added
The YRB continued efforts to gain court sanction
for referrals prior to the signing of a complaint (thus
transferring official responsibility for cases from the
probation department to the YRB) but these efforts never
came to fruition in any formal way. Several referrals
from the court were made in the early months, but even
these tapered off because df the reservations of many
probation officers about the YRB's methods of operation.
One probation officer, who spent an unusual amount of time
on the street, reported that he was satisfied, "by and large"
on the cases he referred, but most officers lacked con-
fidence in the new organization and a few were "absolutely
distraught." Feelings somewhat similar to those of the
police motivated the following comments from various court
staff members:
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-- "YRB's operation was just too cumbersome, and we didn't
know about their responsibility -- we'd rather do it our-
selves"
-- "They were seen as do-gooders by a lot of people, molly-
coddlers. Thef"d put their arm around a kid and tell him
'You're O.K., the rest of the world's against you', when the
kid needed a good kick in the pants."
-- "They (the judges, probation officers, and police) were
never very comfortable with them. It's a very difficult
job to stand between an authority and being an advocate
for the kids -- a very difficult job... and they seemed
from the beginning to be on the street, not in the office.
That was the impression everyone had about them."
--- "Their biggest problem was that they didn't have enough
staff supervision. They tended to over-identify with kids --
you have trouble setting limits if you're a street worker
...you have to really refer kids to places that will help
them, otherwise rapping is just a lot of shit!"
Thus the street image, the lack of authority and the
lack of a concrete structure contributed to court mistrust
of an agency outside their control. Despite their need for
additional resources, probation 6fficers were unwilling to
accept a completely non-authoritarian handling of their
cases, since the show of authority was an integral part of
court ritual. Furthermore, court officials eventually came
to view the YRB as having another mission that set them
apart from the court, "They were picking up kids off the
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street with and without records," commented a probation
officer. "They hadi their own caseload."
These circumstances led the court to go after their
own diversion program4, which very quickly accomplished
what the YRB was unable to do. Under the Ihtake program,
minor first-offender cases could be referred by the clerk
to a special model probation staff without the issuance of
a complaint. If the youth cooperated and was not re-arrested,
the case would be dismissed after 60 (or in some cases 90)
days. This program,,run in the court building, quickly
gained acceptance and received 79 referrals in its first
ten months of operation (almost 30% of all juvenile cases).
A juvenile session judge offered this explanation for the
acceptance of the Intake Program,
It was much easier to sell a program under DiNatale's
(chief of probation) control...to the judge6, the
probation officers, the police, especially the police...
The court just had more credibility with the police
than the YRB. How could you tell the police that
Harvard Law School and the City Manager wanted them
n=t to charge a kid, but to take h m instead over to
some new agency run by some Greek ...from Chicago --
you see what I mean? In the court...you could do it.
The police confirmed this analysistraditionally
trusting the court and being particularly satisfied with
the structure of the process, which left the arresting offi-
cer the option of insisting that a complaint be issued.
Now we refer kids to the Intake Program...It's up to
the judgement of the Clerk and the Police officer
whether or not he goes to Intake or comes up on a
complaint. Intake is better than YRB. It has more
of an official tinge to it, you know; they don't have
to see a judge, but its in court, before a clerk --
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the kids relate it to probation, the whole bit.
They don't really know what it's all about. They
think they're on probation.
Court officials also expressed satisfaction with the fact
that a complaint could be issued if the youth failed to
cooperate, and expressed confidence in the program "because
it is inside the court."
It is worth reviewing in greater detail some of the
features of the Intake program, since they may shed some
light on the features of a diversion program which juvenile
justice officials consider desirable. Some of the signifi-
cant features are:
1) The program is under the direction of the Chief Probation
Officer and housed in the court.
2) Police and court officials have the option of demand
an adjudication hearing at the time of referral and within
90 days. Youths and their families similarly can demand
a judicial hearing.
3) Only first offenders on minor ffenses can be diverted
(16 types of offenses are currently eligible, and the list
may expand, but the majority of the cases to date have been
school-related).
4) The staff is highly professional, and most have had
training in psychology or social work. (On a staff of eight,
all have at least a bachelor's degree, and four held more
advanced degrees). The Probation aides are well supervised.
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5) The program is fairly highly structured, uniformly
involving at least administration of a battery of psycholo-
gical tests and regular meetings with probation aides.
6) The program is aimed at short-term behavior-modification.
It assumes that "overt behavior can be modified without
getting to the underlying causes," Lemphasis added] according
to a staff member. The focus is clearly on individual
remediation.
Since the commencement of the Intake Program, there
have been virtually no more teferrals to the YRB. There
is still informal contact and discussion of cases between
probation officers and YRB workers, since workers often
appear in court with their clients, and there are a few
solid personal relationships. One judge and one probation
officer also sit on the YRB Board, but as the judge commented,
"I miss a lot of their meetings lately." The probation
officer summed up YRB's current role with the courts as,
"They're a resource, like Catholic Charities, Big Brothers
Association, or any other social agency. There aren't any
referrals anymore. Probably I would say the way they're
most useful to me now is in the programs they've set up that
I can channel kids into."
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External Resistance -- Other Agencies
It was estimated that a small proportion of the YRB's
referrals would come from social agencies, particularly the
schools. These referrals did (and do) occur, although on
an extremely irregular basis. An evaluation report on the
YRB conducted by Human Development Associates indicated
that of 170 referrals recorded as of November 1971, 6%
came from Cambridge schoolsand another 8% from other
social agencies.
There are many reasons for the low level of agency
referrals, not the least of which is that it was never
anticipated that these agencies would be a major source
of referrals, and hence were not nearly so actively solicited
as were police and court referrals. Initially there were
a few formal referrals made by agency heads to the YRB
administration, but resistance developed to these on
several fronts.
More traditional agencies, such as the schools and
the Recreation Department, found the YRB to be insufficiently
professional, authoritative, or structured to meet their
needs. "I certainly don't feel the YRB is the agency to
refer our problem kids to", remarked the Superintendent of
Recreation.
They're not equipped or staffed to do a thing to
effectively take care of youngsters in trouble. If
there were excess vandalism in one of our teen
centers, we'd still call the police. I had hoped
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that there would be closer relationships between the
YRB and the Juvenile Bureau of the Police Dept.,
but I don't have any reading that that exists.
The superintendent had been dissatisfied with the
few referrals they had made, complaining that he didn't
really know what the Bureau was doing, that he got insuf-
ficient feedback from them, and that they didn't seem to
be effective in putting a stop to the troublesome activity.
He was not anxious to give youths a record, but he did
want concrete action. "Our Teen Center directors work
just as effectively or better with the kids," he noted.
We'd rather not have to send a youngster to the police
if we can avoid it. Sometimes a worker will talk to
the family or the school, and he'll get things straight-
ened out...If there was damage, they'll tell the
parents and present them with a bill for 50 dollars
for damages -- and the next day we'd get a check
back, and there'd be no more trouble from the boys,
either. They could have been in plenty of trouble
with the court, and their parents knew it!
The superintendent was also concerned that YRB workers would
react by directing efforts at criticizing the relevancy of
recreation programming rather than woiking with the indivi-
dual troublemaking youth. "They shouldn't be doing teen
center work, or any recreation programming. They should
be working to restore togetherness in family units, keep
kids out of court, and their parents off welfare. They
can communicate any needs they identify to us -- we'll take
care of them..."
The schools had some similar problems with the YRB.
To some extent, as noted before, the very existence of the
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YRB was a threat to the school: if they began referrals
to YRB, they would be forced to admit the existence of
massive systemic problems which the schools preferred
to keep quiet. For example, the school officially
claimed a drop-out rate of less than 5%, whereas unoffi-
cial studies conducted by various private and city groups
indicated that the actual rate was closer to 40%. A
controversial changeover in Cambridge school administra-
tion made it difficult, initially, for the YRB to estab-
ish a formal relationship, and YRB staff reported that re-
lations were further strained by YRB staff criticism of
the racial and academic policies of the conservative in-
terim administration. Although individual teachers and
counselors established relations with a few detached
workers around individual problems, the high schools
came to rely eventually on the Intake Program for the
handling of their problem cases; the existence of a
professional staff with testing capabilities, especially
testing for reading disabilities, was cited as a primary
reason for preferring the Intake Program to the YRB.
Other traditional social work agencies also charged that
the YRB was "too unprofessional" and had "poor staff super-
vision."
Some of the non-traditional agencies, such as the
Model Cities.Multi-Service Center or the Group School (a
student-controlled alternative high school in Cambridge),
held off on referrals for the opposite reason- -- they were
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uncertain that the YRB was sufficiently committed to youth
advocacy when conflicts with "the establishment" arose.
Most agencies, however, simply reported that they believed
they could handle most of their cases better themselves
and could refer directly to another agency if needed rather
than going through the YRB. As a referral resource, the
YRB was regarded more as a provider of a street-work
service than as a central clearing house for referrals.
Inside the YRB -- The Need for Redefinition
As resistance mounted from the police, the courts,
and the agencies, the YRB was increasingly pushed in the
direction of youth advocacy. The line staff had few con-
tacts with officials from these organizations and received
little from them in the way of personal rewards. They did
have considerable street contact however, and it was from
these youths that staff derived most of their work satis-
faction. Crisis situations, including riots at the schools,
and police brutality in the black section of Cambridge
further forced line staff into taking visible stands against
"the establishment". As the YRB director later reflected,
"The detached workers couldn't function in the neighbor-
hoods without being affected by the political and social
undercurrents of those neighborhoods...it led to a situa-
tion which fostered very polarized stands." And the more
polarized the line staff became, the more the juvenile
justice system became antagonized; the more antagonistic
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they became, the more the YRB staff gravitated towards
the youths' sides, etc. Despite the administrations'
efforts to mollify police and court officials, it soon
became apparent that the court diversion or referral
model simply was not feasible.
Many of the staff had become disenchanted with the
referral model by then anyway. As a YRB consultant ob-
served, "A lot of those kids YRB street workers weren't
too comfortable working with police to begin with". As
the detached fieldwork expanded, it became clear that the
YRB could easily acquire a full caseload without police
and court referrals, since communities would readily
absorb new available resources. Street workers found that
local youths began to make increasing demands on their time;
and there were always new groups they had not yet reached,
new neighborhoods clamoring for a share of their time and
attention. Many workers preferred to work with the youths
that they contacted on the streets, rather than referred
youth. These youths were likely to be more cooperative,
and workers had much more freedom in dealing with them.
Furthermore, workers reported that they found more satis-
faction and less frustration in helping a youth to avoid
trouble than in trying to bail him out after he had already
become entangled in the juvenile justice system. One
former staff worker expressed his feelings this way,
They [court referrals3 would automatically identify
you with authority. It was much easier to get in
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touch with kids on the street, seeing them in their
own environment. The referral model is basically
bullshit. It serves the courts and the cops; its
not there for the kid. The referral agency doesn't
do shit for kids.
Thus, by the time the juvenile justice system agencies had
become disenchanted with the YRB, many staff workers had
become disenchanted with the idea of providing a simple
referral service for the police and the courts.
As the failure of the referral model became increa-
singly clear, the internal power struggle intensified as
the Bureau sought to redefine its goals and establish a
new direction for itself. As a former worker recalled,
"There was a major goal struggle. The staff looked to Ted
[the directorj for direction, and also they wanted to push
their own views. Ted wanted to be "the director" and at
the same time he was looking to his staff for direction."
There was considerable confusion, and individuals became
increasingly frustrated over the lack of standards by which
to measure their success.
Some of the street workers were apparently content to
simply continue individual casework with neighborhood youth,
providing counseling and acting as advocates for them in
securing services. Workers took particular pride in their
abiltiy to work with "tough kids", to keep them out of
trouble, to avert crises, and evoke the trust of their
youth. Black workers took particular pride in their ability
to penetrate the balck neighborhoods, avert racial crises,
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and to speak for the needs of the black community youths.
There were several problems, however, with shifting
to a straight detached worker program. In the first place,
a straight direct-service detached field worker program was
clearly far too limited to be consistent with the original
goals of youth service bureaus. Youth service bureaus
were specifically supposed to avoid the direct provision of
services; they were to avoid becoming just another social
arvice agency. Youth service bureaus were supposed to be
new agencies with new approaches which would play a
centralized role in guiding delinquency prevention efforts
in the community. Detached field work programs were not
new; they had a history clouded by the tinge of old and
inadequate social work techniques, and other agencies could
regard such a program as an entirely separate, rather low-
prestige service which had no clear relation to their
activities.Pure reliance on a direct service detached worker
program would be too significant a departure from the ori-
ginal youth service bureau concept, would be a blow to much
of the staff's original expectations for the Bureau, and
would probably jeopardize future funding from the Governor's
Committee.
In the second place, several members of the line staff
were becoming frustrated with the short-sightedness of in-
dividual casework. These workers either came to the Bureau
with a very structural view of delinquency (primarily a few
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recent Harvard graduates), or acquired it as a result of
their street work experience. These workers came to have
a radically different view of their target population than
the original YRB proposal assumed. As they became familiar
with the youth in their area, they learned that often
the majority of youths were involved in delinquent behavior
or heading toward it, and that dissatisfaction with the
schools, the police, the teen centers, and many such insti-
tutions was widespread, if not universal. One worker esti-
mated that as much as 80% of the youth in Cambridge could
be officially considered delinquent, or pre-delinquent. 6
As the street workers continued working with these
youth, frustration mounted over their inability to make
lasting changes in youths' lives. As one worker put it,
After a while you say to yourself, 'Hey, wait a
minute. I'm not going to get up out of bed at
2:00 in the morning every time John Jones calls
to tell me he's going to jump off the roof of
Roosevelt Towers...I know he's not going to jump.
And I'm not really accomplishing anything -- be-
cause he's going to come down to the same lousy
problems that sent him up there in the first place.'
Workers got frustrated when they had to go to court
time and time again for youths who were arrested for
"cutting up on the street corner because there was no
place else to go" or who were charged with assault and
battery on a police officer but looked badly beaten and
swore the police started it; or they got frustrated going
up to try to get kids back in school who were quitting
because they thought the education was irrelevant or that
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the teachers were.racists. "After a while, it gets to be
ridiculous," a former youth worker explained. "I mean it
gets to be pretty obvious that some of those institutions
have to change." Thus, many of the street workers came to
view much of the youths'"delinquency" as being a result of
dysfunctions of their social institutions and, seeing the
same "delinquent" activity constantly, came to view much
of this "delinquency" as at least a somewhat sane response
to their social conditions. In crisis situations, where
there were riots at the schools with black youths and parents
demanding the superintendent's resignation or where there
were massive demonstrations after police beatings resulted
in the deaths of two black youths, many of the street workers
strongly believed tht the YRB should play a leadership role
in advocating youths' viewpoints and producing institutional
change. These more radical street workers wanted to retain
the detached worker model, but believed that the primary
focus of the Bureau should be on community organizing and
resource deVelopment aimed at institutional change, rather
than on direct services to individual youth.
Finally, the administration also had good reason to
avoid a detached fieldwork program as the eventual endpoint
for the Bureau. On the one hand, several of the staff had
observed that the director was "not comfortable supervising
fieldwork" and preferred working in the political arena with
agency heads and city officials. But more importantly,
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the director explained that he believed that, in the long-
run, a broader approach was critical to the Bureau's sur-
vival. As a private agency head observed, "They've got a
budget of what? about one-quarter million dollars. Where
would they get that kind of money as a private agency? How
would they do it?" And the YRB director underscored the
observation, "It was clear that revenue sharing was coming
down from Washington. There weren't going to be any more
direct Federal grants to agencies, it was all going to go
to the cities...The YRB floats because I've made sure we've
always had city matching funds. Otherwise we couldn't sur-
vive." Thus it was clear that whatever the YRB's future
direction was, it had to be fairly clearly within the public
sphere if the agency was to survive. As the director
sought outside sources of funding, he found that new Federal
and city dollars could be attracted by developing new ser-
vices or for coordination of existing services. A detached
worker program could too easily be viewed as one public
agency head expressed it, "the business of a private case-
work agency, not a public agency."
There was no clear consensus among the staff, however,
on the direction that the agency should take. According
to several staff members (and also outside observers), "All
of our psychic energy was being poured inward." Individual
staff members pushed their own views and began operating
independently, as the administration hesitated, unsure of
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what to do next, and blocking many staff actions out of
fear that they would antagonize others and further jeopar-
dize future roles which the Bureau might assume in the
City. "The Bureau was paralyzed into inaction", a former
staff member explained, "and some of the best people got
turned off by the lack of action. They became increasingly
radical." As the radical staff pushed for the Bureau to
commit itself to a goal of systems change, the Governor's
Committee took action to further their cause.
The Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement
Impact of the Funding Source
Initially, the Governor's Committee took little
initiative in trying to shape the direction of its Youth
Resource Bureaus. In late 1970, however, Dr. Kenneth
Polk became the consultant to the Committee and heavily
influenced several of the young administrators there
who were responsible for the administration of the YHBs.
One former juvenile delinquency specialist, Paul Fontane,
explained their receptiveness to Polk in the following way.
We were just B.A.s practically just out of college.
We didn't really know much about juvenile delinquency
... so we relied heavily on Ken, Josephine and Ira
(other consultants} who had more experience. We
pretty much went along with whatever the communities
wanted until Ken came along and gave us a real idea
of what we wanted. He was the first person who
really seemed to have some concrete ideas about
Youth Service Bureaus and what they should be doing.
As indicated in the first chapter, Polk's conception
of youth service bureaus represente a fairly significant
86
departure from the Crime Commission's concept. As the above
specialist put it, "Ken was opposed to the referrals and
coordinating services bit -- he thought it was a lot of
bullshit." As outlined in Chapter One, Polk favored a
YSB model which included individual counseling and treat-
ment, but which stressed working as a "systems change agent"
to increase community responsiveness to youth problems, to
open youth opportunities for participation in community
activities and decision-making, to influence the development
of institutional programs as an alternative to the justice-
correction system, and to create new kinds of education-
work flows which expand youth opportunities to achieve
"success". His approach, according to Fontane, stressed
involving youth in solving problems within their own peer
groups and within the larger social context. He strongly
advocated developing a "New Careers"8 strategy within the
helping professions, a strategy which could begin by hiring
youth as Bureau workers to deal with the problems of other
youths.
Late in 1970, under contract to the Governor's
Committee, Polk began providing regular technical assistance9
to the (then three) YRBs operating in Massachusetts, but
none of the Bureaus were very receptive to his ideas. At
that time, the Cambridge YRB was just beginning their attempt
to establish a referral model. Fontane recalled one of the
sessions Polk had with the YRB director.
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Ted wouldn't buY his youth-to-youth or new careers
stuff, He was a traditional social worker. I
thought Ken was making good sense...Ted just wouldn't
listen, though; he wouldn't do anything new in
that direction, he'd just talk different, you know
.. I was hot on their program before too,...but he
just wasn't creative enough...then became disen-
chanted with the YRBs and he got us disenchanted too.
Over a period of over two years, the Cambridge YRB
received increasingly consistent messages from a series
of Committee juvenile delinquency specialists to move to-
wards a systems change focus. As a consultant to the de-
linquency staff, Ira Goldenberg strengthened the staff's
commitment to a structural view of delinquency causation,10
leading to a policy of giving priority to programs aimed at
"collective advocacy...for and with youth...aimed at
widening access to power and goods for disadvantaged youth."
Specifically, the Cambridge YRB was urged to move on three
fronts: 1) to organize a street political base to advocate
youth issues, 2) to provide funding to other agencies to
stimulate new or better services, and 3) to be general
lobbyists for increasing the power and resources of youth.
It would not be accurate to state, however, that the
Juvenile Delinquency Section was representative of the
views of the Governor's Committee. Interviewed Committee
staff and consultants indicated that the Committee Adminis-
tration was generally more conservative than its staff and
more sensitive to the political implications of its actions.
As Fontane indicated, "They [the Administration] didn't
really buy Ken's stuff." A staff consultant characterized
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the Executive Director and Associate Director in the
following manner:
The Director isa very sharp guy...He's very sensi-
tive to the political dlimate. He$s got political
ambitions in this state...I think he'd like to be
a judge...he wants to do things quietly and he
wants to be very careful about making any waves
.,,so he'll go with the tide. But he's basically
a liberal-type guy -- I mean, deep in his guts,...
he'd like to do liberal-type things. And when the
tide is bwinging toward the liberals, he goes along
with it happily and he'll push it along. But when
the tide rolls back the other way, he'll be a little
reluctant, a little slow, but he'll go with it...
The Associate Director on the other hand, goes
just the opposite. When the tide swings toward the
liberals, he's depressed, but he glumly goes along
with it -- but when it swings towards the conser-
vatives, he'll be right out in front leading the
way...
It is significant, though, that despite this relatively
middle-of-the-road administration, the Governor's Committee
was a setting which was supportive to the existence of
individuals trying to implement social change goals. This
fact may be the result of two situations: 1) as a state
agency which disbursed funds for programs at the local level,
the Governor's Committee was not immediately affedted by the
impact of the programs it funded. As one Committee consul-
tant put it, "Sure,...the Governor's Committee isn't
threatened by social change in Cambridge or Brockton."
2) The Committee had only minimal accountabilty to the Fed-
eral Governemnt for the way it spent its funds. Two delin-
quency specialists both indicated that they did hot feel
that Federal LEAA pressures had affected their handling of
their YRB's and that while the request for statistics or
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guidelines handed down from the Federal Government con-
stituted some indirect pressure, they were fairly easily
manipulated. Several Governor's Committee staff members
indicated that the Massachusetts LEAA planning agency
operated fairly independently, and was much more liberal
than its counterparts in other states, spending "a lot
less on police helmets and riot gear." Only recently,
they indicated, since the Nixon Administration's firm
stand on law and order has the Committee felt constrained
by the Washington political atmosphere.
Thus the Governor's Committee exhibited a fairly
high tolerance for the existence of would-be social
change agents. The staff of the Juvenile Delinquency
Section considered it to be the "radical corner" of the
Governor's Committee, and one staff member offered an
explanation for their survival;
We were a pretty far-out bunch for this place
when we first came here. We had...freaky-looking
people with long-hair and beards...and we had some
pretty radical ideas...And I think a certain part
of the director felt really good about having
us there. We were away in our own office kind of
stuck back in a corner, but we could be trotted
out when it was convenient and he could say, 'See,
look at the racy new programs we got going on in here'
...we had a couple of Ph.Ds and some new ideas, and
those could be prestigious things for the Committee.
Within the Committee's politically imposed constraints
on the allocation of funds among Massachusetts cities, the
juvenile delinquency specialists were fairly free to de-
sign programs, encourage or discourage proposals, and help
fund programs which fit their personal perceptions of what
was worthwhile or needed.
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Once programs were funded, however, it was very
difficult for the Governor's Committee to control their
direction. The Committee had essentially six possible
means of influencing the YRB:
1) Direct Communication -- one delinquency specialist,
for example reported that she spoke to or met with the
YRB director about once every ten days to two weeks, occa-
sionally dropping in at their office.
2) Technical assistance -- the Governor's Committee's
technical assistance team met with the YRB director and/
or staff at regular intervals, varying from once a month
to twice a week on issues of programming, goal-setting,
staff supervision, crisis intervention, etc.
3) Veto power over personnel hirings
4) Evaluations and reports -- formal and informal evalua-
tions were either conducted by juvenile delinquency staff
or were contracted out. The Grant Management section of
the Committee required quarterly and other reports on Bureau
fiscal and program activity, sometimes requiring performance
statistics. The Annual Comprehensive Plans published by
the Committee were also a means of communicating the
Committee's goals and objectives for its programs.
5) Grant-conditioning -- or making payment of funds depen-
dent on the YRB's meeting certain requirements
6.) The threat of de-funding.
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According to the Gbvernor's Committee staff, how-
ever, there were several reasons why these mechanisms
proved to be of limited effectiveness, including:
1) tremendous staff turnover;("I remember there were
about five different fiscal managers responsible for
Cambridge programs over a period of about a year and a half",
remarked Fontane), 2) limited staff time for program
supervision, and 3) distance from the localities where
the programs operated; plus internal and external political
constraints.
These factors limited the effectiveness of the
first and second mechanisms listed above. The staff
responsible for meeting with the YRB kept changing, and
different representatives presented different demands,
sometimes with Grant Management representatives requesting
caseload statistics while juvenile delinquency specialists
urged getting away from a caseload approach. But, with the
staff turnovers, even juvenile delinquent specialists were
not always consistent. As Golden remarked,
As we would pick things up...our ideas on what
we wanted from them changed -- but no one at the
agency could afford to let them know that, so we'd
start telling them something different, and pre-
tend we'd been telling them that all along.
Furthermore, the staff at the YRB became increasingly
suspicious of Governor's Committee Staff. The YRB director
commented, "Most of the people they sent down here had never
spent any time on the streets. They just had no under-
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standing of the problems we had to face over here!"
Josephine Lambert, the head of the technical assistance
team, agreed that there was a lack of sensitivity to daily
local problems on the part of many Governor's Committee
representatives that occasionally led to what she felt
were unreasonable demands. Even Committee staff admitted
their limitations in this regard, and for that reason
felt reluctant to make use of the third and fifth control
mechanisms (personnel, grant conditioning). "I was against
conditioning grants then," Fontane recalled. "We were
just too unsophisticated and had too many staff turnovers --
I felt it was better to let the communities handle it their
own way." He indicated that, "We tried putting condi-
tioning on their grants, but they were rarely substantively
followed up by me or the Committee -- I just didn't have
the time of the ability to coerce them." Another delin-
quency staff member indicated that they had never vetoed
the hiring of any YRB staff because they just didn't have
the time and weren't sufficiently involved to feel quali-
fied to make judgements; though Fontane indicated the
Committee had lent support through endorsements to the Diree-
tor in the early stages in his attempt to hire some ex-
offenders and block some pressures to make patronage appoint-
ments.
The Governor's Committee administration, in
attempting to avoid controversy and respond to pressure
to continue funding from local politicians, also limited the
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ability of delinquency specialists to exercise potential
sanctions. The juvenile delinquency staff felt that the
Administration would let them go "just so far". As was
suggested before, many of them believed that the Director
did not want to create controversy and did not want to let
the agency stray t= far from the middle-of-the-road. Thus
annual reports, evaluations, requests for Bureau reports all
contained softer language than the juvenile delinquency
staff probably would have used and many times stressed
individual remediation approaches as well as systems change
approaches. Demands for "hard statistics" on diversion
often appear contradictory with the delinquency staff em-
phasis on changing institutions and developing alternative
programs and settings. Furthermore, in the time that I
was associated with the Governor's Committee, two attempts
were made at producing a juvenile delinquency strategy paper,
but both were rejected as unsatisfactory, and the staff's
feeling was that the reason was because the administration
could not afford to be committed on paper to a collective
advocacy-systems change approach to delinquency programming.
The need to respond to local political funding
pressures also affected the ability to use funding cutbacks
as a means of coercing prograsm to conform or be eliminated.
As a former Committee consultant stated, "You couldn't
write them a letter and -tell them they were being de-funded
because they weren't subversive enough!". In fact it was
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very difficult to cut off funds at all because of the
political complications involved in channeling funds
through city governments. One delinquency specialist
recalled that she had tried "several times to kill the
Brockton YRB" because she believed their approach "too
psychiatric", too aimed at individual change, and that
"the director was not receptive to changing the direction
of the program". One year, she recalled, during the annual
budget review, she tried to cut their budget back,
but [the Directorj wouldn't stick up for it in the
full Governor's Committee meeting. The mayor of
Brockton got all upset and protested to...the top
Committee people (and I don't know who else)...
There was always a political trade-off on funds.
Most of the money had to go to the cities, and
if we cancelled their juvenile delinquency pro-
gram, we'd probably end up giving them riot gear
instead.
Despite her objections to the Cambridge YRB because of
1) their inability to "make up their mind whether they were
a youth agency or a city agency" and 2) their "ineffective
management" -- their inability to "share power and respon-
sibility", she indicated that their budget was increased
each year while she was there, "because they kept asking
for it"and the amount of money coming into the Governor's
Committee kept increasing. When the CYRB's budget was
finally cut back in 1973 by 25%, the reasons that were used
were a decrease in the Governor's Committee total budget
and the fact that it was a "fourth year program".
In summary, although there was a clear and fairly
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steady stream of inputs from the funding source pushing
the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau in the direction of
social change, the Governor's Committee's impact was much
less significant than might have been expected. Staff
limitations and their distance from the daily problems of
the Bureau constrained the ability of juvenile delinquency
staff to intervene in the goals struggle, staff crises,
and actions of the Bureau. Even the technical assistance
mechanism was of limited effectiveness because staff
turnovers at the Committee left virtually no juvenile
delinquency specialists for Lambert to report to for an
extended period of time. The Committee was further con-
strained by their lack of real sanctions which resulted
from the necessity of responding to local government
funding aspirations and priorities.
Observers at both the YRB and the Governor's Committee
noted that to some extent the Committee's lack of appre-
ciation for the problems of the youth services bureaus model
coupled with their "bureaucratic meddling" had the effect
of retarding the development of the CYRB and further con-
tributing to its confusion and turmoil. Josephine Lambert,
writing in May of 1971 commented that,
The Governor's Committee is also another barrier
to the efficient functioning of the YRB. Because
of legislative mandates, the staff of the Committee
are always pressured to prove the validity of the
programs they have funded. Guidelines and blue-
prints are handed down from on high...Because of
this, the YRB staff are constantly caught in a
series of memos, conditions and proposal writing
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which happers creative programming. Agencies that
have to exist on a three, six, or nine month funding
basis cannot begin to prove the value of their
being...Therefore, whether the model employed by a
particular city is viable rests with so many inter-
vening factors that the Committee,...need to examine
the realities faced by the bureaus, and how f nding
processes can be help instead of hindrance.
Resolving CYRB Goals
The impact of the Governor's Committee on the CYRB
goal-setting process was not negligible however. At
about the time that Ron Hansen was taking over as delin-
quency planner (the end of 1971), the 1972 YRB funding
proposal was being drafted; the YRB was in the midst of
its goal struggles; Hanson and other members of the Committee
were receiving input on the YRB from street worker Gus
Myman, a former student of Ira Goldenberg's and a strong
systemic change advocate within the Bureau; Hanson's power
within the Governor's Committee was apparently increasing
in the most recent reorganization. As a juvenile delinquency
staff member put it, "Ron really laid a heavy rap on them"
concerning the direction he believed the YRBs should take.
The YRB staff subsequently had several meetings in order to
agree on a goals statement draft to include in their 1972
funding proposal. Between Hanson's message and the urgings
of the more radical YRB staff, the statement that emerged
clearly identified systemic changes as the primary goal of
the Bureau, indicating "the purpose of the Bureau" as being,
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to divert the youth of Cambridge from involve-
ment with the Juvenile Justice System, and by
so doing, cause that system to be modified...
these same youth are a part of and are affected
by other systems such as the educational and
economic systems. Therefore, it is also the
purpose of the Bureau to help youth function
within and change the systems...change in this
context to be defined as an identifiable dif-
ference over time in the power, values, and
structure of the system. All of the activities
of the Bureau should be directed towards
changing the negative elements of relevant
systems within which youth play a part, as well
as enhancing...positive elements... Activities
on the part of the staff which are not directed
toward change within the systems, or which...
maintain...the status quo of negative elements,
are clearly inappropriate and non-productive.
The proposal, furthermore, in sharp contrast to the 1971
proposal, made only token reference to the referral model,
and discusses projected 1972 activities with the police,
courts, and agencies almost entirely in the context of
developing or modifying programs.
Thus, at least rhetorically, the YRB had pretty
clearly committed itself to a systems change goal. One
must be wary, however, of confusing rhetoric with reality.
It would soon become apparent that "systems change"
had considerably different meanings for different staff
members, and in practice, individual remediation and the
provision of direct services remained as competing goals.
It was clear, though, that the referral model was no longer
viable, and the internal focus shifted to the problem of
how to implement the goal of social change.
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FOOTNOTES
1. All YRB staff hirings were subject to the approval
of the City Manager,
2. Social Policy: Issues of Choice and Change (New York,
1970), p. 52.
3. Richard A. Cloward, Social Problems, Social Definitions,
and Social _oportunities, prepared for the Region Insti-
tutes on Juvenile Delinquency and Social Forces (April,1963) as quoted in Rein p. 53.4. The Court had traditiondly preferred to develop
services internally rather than rely on outside
agencies.
5. The YRB director of Greek nationality, came to
Cambridge from Chicago.
6. Daniel Case,, Gerald M. Croan, et al., Delinauency,
Another Perspective: A Survey of Youth Needs in Two
Communities (Boston, 1973).
7. Kenneth Polk, "Delinquency Prevention and the Youth
Service Bureau", Criminal Law Bulletin, vol. VII,
(July - August, 1971)
8. For a more detailed explanation of the "New Careers"
concept see.Pearl, Arthur and Frank Riessman, New
Careers for the Poor (new York, 1965), summarized
in Mayer, pp. 74-80.
9. Primarily in the form of consultation with the
directors on program development and training
sessions with the staff. Contact was approxi-
mately bi-weekly.
10. In A Theoretical and Concentual Approach to Juvenile
to Juvenile Delinauency: Implications for Planning
(Boston, 1972) p. 11. Goldenberg states, "...juvenile
delinquency...can be defined as a condition of being
in which the 'offender'...serves notice to the world
that he will no longer be contained or deluded by a
social system which fails to take him or his needs
seriously."
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CHAPTER IV: CREATING SYSTEMS CHANGE -- YRB IN-ACTION
The YBB's shift to a systems change goal failed to
relieve internal tensions. Instead, staff conflicts in-
tensified as the Bureau sought to define and implement
change strategies appropriate to their level of resources
and credibility. As the YRB program coordinator commented
in the Fall of 1973, "The total staff is unified on goals,
but divided on methodology."
Chapter Four will examine the Bureau's attempts to
implement a systems change goal. It will begin with an
articulation of the constraints on YRB activity imposed by
the Cambridge City Government. It will then explore the
effects of these constraints and the differences in staff
roles on: the process of selecting a methodology for
systems change; the process of setting institutional
priorities for action; and the ability of the YRB to sustain
itself in a systems change role. Finally, the chapter
will conclude with an assessment of the YRB's impact and
its capacity for creating change.
101
Political Constraints -- The City's Role
As was indicated in Chapter II, the new city
administration which took office after the hiring of
the YRB director had not been involved in the original
effort to establish the Youth Resources Bureau, and hence
had no particular stake in it. However, Paul Lerner,
the new Assistant City Manager, who was the primary
city liason with the YRB, entered his position with
some pre-conceptions of what the Youth Resources Bureau
should be doing.
Lerner's conception was vague, but he saw two pri-
mary functions as being appropriate for the YRB: diver-
sion and coordination. He viewed diversion as an alter-
native to the courts for dealing with youth who get into
trouble, but who are not really "bad kids". The YRB
could help school officials, for example, determine "when
a kid needs help...and when he need institutionalization".
The YRB could then "act as a catalyst to get them [the school,
social welfare agenctes, and the youth] to work together
to solve the kid's problems...help him to make it in the
system". He viewed coordination both in terms of coordin-
ating and thereby making the most efficient use of existing
youth programs and resources, and in terms of making "kids
aware of the help...opportunities, and resources that are
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available to them." In either case, Lerner saw the YRBI's
role as being quite limited -- restricted to "communicating
to others what is available" and "complementing the activi-
ties of other agencies". He emphasized that "they shouldn't
do their own resource development, or else they have their
own self-interests." Thus Lerner saw the YRB not only as
a means of helping to keep some youth out of trouble, but
also as a means of economizing through efficient use of
resources. Furthermore, he had no long-term commitment
to fulfilling these needs, commenting, "If Federal money
dried up, it Ethe YRBJ could just be dissolved."
Lerner also stated that he was "alarmed" by the change
in direction (to systems change) discussed in the 1972 YRB
funding proposal. Initially, as far as the YRB's efforts
were concerned, there had been little friction between the
city administration and the YRB. However, as the detached-
worker model developed, as conflict with the juvenile jus-
tice system widened, and as the YRB focus shifted to systems
change, city disaffection with the YRB mounted.
Over the course of an interview, Lerner indicated at
least five aspects of the YRB's operation that disturbed
him because they were either disruptive to city priorities
for maintaining order, or threatened city administration
attempts to centralize power. In the first place, Lerner
saw the YRB as ineffective in controlling delinquency.
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because of their non-authoritarian approach and their
failure to take delinquency seriously. "Street work
is just that; it's all bullshit," he indicated.
It doesn't change kids' attitudes;... the YRB
gets kids off, and the kids laugh that they got
away; it encourages more kids to do it. I talk
to their workers and they tell me ripping off
cars is not really serious. Well, I think maybe
it is serious...I think those kids need a little
fear of being caught.
Lerner also viewed the YRB as alienating youth
from the society by incorrectly blaming delinquency on
the society, indicating,
You have to tell the kid he can make it if he works
at it...not put your arm around him and tell him
there's something wrong with the rest of the so-
ciety, not him. The YRB...tells him he's O.K.,
it's just that everyone's against him.
Lerner further saw the YRB as disrupting the ability
of present institutions to carry out their function in
controling delinquency. Specifically he mentioned the
Probation and Police Departments as being upset over the
interference of the YRB in their cases.
Lerner was also concerned that the YRB (because of its
neighborhood focus) tended to decentralize services instead
of centralizing them. Lerner believed that services should
centralized so as to "take maximum advantage of existing
resources."
Finally, Lerner saw the YRB as becoming a large
city bureaucracy involving considerable public funds, and
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pursuing its own self-interests independent of City Hall
priorities. As the YRB obtained increased Federal grants
(and correspondingly, increased local matching funds) to
support new staff and new programs in new areas of the
city, Lerner became increasingly concerned over the
rising public cost, especially without city ability to
manipulate expenditures according to its priorities.
"Basically they're not responsive to City Hall," he com-
plained. "...They're supposed to coordinate...and reduce
waste, but instead they have their own interests...I don't
know why, but every damn time you set up a government
program, they want to build an empire."
Thus Lerner, the most influential man in City Hall
as far as the YRB was concerned, had several reasons for
disliking the systems change goal of the YRB and for re-
sisting YRB attempts at program expansion -- since the goal
was disruptive to city priorities for order, and expansion
threatened city administration attempts to centralize power.
Lerner further indicated that he intended to "try damn
hard" to "turn the YRB around" and bring it under closer
city control. The city, furthermore, had several avenues
available to it for doing so.
There were at least four types of formal sanctions
available to the city, aside from the general mandate of
the City Manager as the chief administrator for the City:
personnel control, proposal sign off, budgetary control,
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and reorganization.
The City Manager technically has the power to fire
the director, and all staff hirings must be approved by
the City Manager. Secondly, the YRB proposal for LEAA
funds must be approved by the City Manager, thus giving
him an opportunity to intervene in the goal-setting
policy decisions of the agency. The City Manager's Office
also has responsibility for preparing the City budget for
all line departments and agencies. (Lerner was also
Acting Director of Budget and Personnel.) The budget
must then be approved by the City Council. Additionally,
all YRB expenditures are subject to the approval of the
City Manager or Auditor (appointed by the City Council),
and all expenditures of over $100.00 require a City
Council sign-off. The City administration can manipulate
the amount of in-kind resources, including rental space,
which it will make available to the YRB. Finally, it is
within the power of the City Manager, generally with
Council approval, to reorganize the responsibilities
of agencies, transferring functions between agencies,
subordinating one agency head to another department head, etc.
These are powerful sanctions, but for a number of
reasons which Lerner discussed, they did not give the
City as much control over the YRB as it might appear.
Primarily, the City's ability to utilize its sanctions
is constrained by the public visibility of its actions,
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and the accountability of the Councilors to their dis-
tricts and of the City Manager to the City Council (see
Chapter II). Another limitation is the lack of city
administrative staff, funds and time to monitor agency
activity. Lerner explained the first limitation with,
"The City can't just manipulate them the YRB according
to cost benefit ratios -- their agency is too volatile
to do what you think is right," and he indicated concern
that moves on his part to bring the YRB under closer
control would be interpreted by his critics as "empire-
building". He also bemoaned city staff limitations which
he indicated made it impossible to conduct the evaluations
or investigations of agency activities and hirings which
would justify exercising potential sanctions. There was
no internal personnel training to supply staff to agencies;
budgets tended to be relatively fixed from year to year
based on department head recommendations. "Practically,
the system precludes the City Manager from [running the
city) . It runs itself...and the City Council can do
much less -- they have almost no staff."
Aside from these general limitations on the Cambridge
City administration, the YRB had one additional point of
leverage: it was bringing considerable amount of federal
money into the city (almost $150,000 in 1972). By clever
maneuvering, the YRB could take advantage of the City's
desire not to jeopardize the continuation of federal
funding. Lerner commented,
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elrelumY9 wiseetheir appi icat4
oursu } wa s come in th nat e ast
minute. I was alarmed by some of the things in
those proposals. I said, 'Wait a minute, I think
we should take a look at the direction these
people are going in'...But they'd get Connie
Wheeler rChairman of the YRB Board and a former
City Council membet3 to go straight to Ethe
City Mangeij and tell him it had to be signed
right away or they'd lose the federal funds...
So it would be rushed through without anybody
really reading it.
Thus the availability of outside funding gave the YRB
additional freedom to pursue its own course.
Despite these limitations on the City administra-
tion's power to use its formal sanctions, the City re-
tained considerable ability to informally affect YRB
activities and thus influence their direction. Lerner
indicated that he had numerous indirect means of frus-
trating the YRB projects of which he disapproved. "I can
get mad. I can give them little hassles," he explained,
and by way of an example he indicated that " I can slow up
the paperwork, let it sit on my desk for a few weeks or'
longer...that really makes them decide on what the 'musts'
are! It's not a professional approach, but it works..."
Through this mechanism, the City administration could
delay and often effectively block YRB attempts at hiring
staff, filling Board positions, finding rental space for
their projects, paying staff or hired youth, getting equip-
ment for projects, etc. This mechanism could not only
thwart YRB efforts, it could also embarass them publicly,
by rendering them incapable of delivering on promise,
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and contribute to internal staff job dissatisfaction and
dissension (especially since the resistance was subtle
and largely blocked from public view). Furthermore, if
the YRB became too radical and alienated too many power-
ful Cambridge political figures, the city administration
would have the support it needed to make bolder, more
dramatic use of its sanctions. Lerner let the YRB
director know, from time to time, when he disapproved of
the agency's actions (as would the mayor or city council
members). At the same time he was slowly documenting a
case for stronger action, indicating to the City Council
"where we're going" in the area of Human Services and
Education and"showing them the waste and implication in the
system".
The City, then, was an important source of resis-
tance to the YRB's systemic change goal with considerable
power to undermine the agency. YRB administrative and
line staff were not equally sensitive to this influence,
however.
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Defining An ApproDriate Methodology --
The Administration's Persoective
As was indicated earlier, the YRB director apparently
began with a fairly flexible conception of the agency's
role and a desire to experiment with different approaches
to change. A former staff member observed that, "He had
a psychological self-image as...a progressive innovator.
He was attracted to people with new ideas". Several staff
members observed that in the beginning he did not try to
give a specific strategy direction, but rather encouraged
staff initiatives. Jack, a former worker, recalled, "He
was always saying, 'Work with me and we'll do it together.
It's us and the kids against the city.'"
In practiceghowever, there proved to be definite
limits on the range of change strategies which the director
was willing or felt he was able to pursue. As Chapter III
indicated, he was very politically conscious and acutely
sensitive to the YRB's dependence on public funds for sur-
vival. This sensitivity was no doubt heightened by the
fact that internal YRB structure put administrative staff
in a position of having very little contact with youth
while dealing regularly with agency heads, city officials,
and funding source representatives.
Consequently, interviews with administrative staff
revealed fairly conservative expectations and an extended
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time-table for systems change, as well as a conviction
that it was necessary to work within the system. The
director's perception of the constraints imposed by the
YRB's funding and administrative status was reflected in
statements like,
When we were new and first hit the streets, we
were immediately branded as another renegade a-
gency...People should have realized that as a
public agency we couldn't go that far out.
and
...we'd privately incorporate if we could, but
there're no funds. We're forced to politic at
the local level...we have to accept our city
tinge...the way we're funded makes change difficult.
This perception of limitations led the director to the
conviction that it was necessary for the Bureau to proceed
cautiously, utilizing strategies which would alienate
city officials as little as possible. A former YRB worker
recalled the director often told them,
There's a conservative majority on the City Coun-
cil and the School Committee. We can't cause
trouble there, or they won't like us when we come
to them for funding; they won't let us in the
schools, and all...We've got to establish good
working relationships, then we can hit them with
the big stuff.
Thus the strategies for change indicated by the
administrative staff reflected their concern for political
constraints. In interviews, the director, assistant direc-
tor and program coordinator all stressed the need to build
credibility with established institutions. They believed
that before they could begin to impact local agencies and
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institutions, it would take time to establish their ex-
pertise and success in handling youth and delinquency
problems, and demonstrate that they were a permanent
force to be reckoned with, "not just another agency
that comes and goes". The program coordinator outlined
an overall strategy for change which included establishing
viability by:
--getting the Bureau together internally
--gathering the relevant facts about delinquency
--getting a constituency together
--lining up internal contacts
and then effecting change by:
--educating from within
-- attacking from without
On the face of it, this plan would appear to include
of both, what the agency referred to as "within the system"
and "outside the system" strategies. All three adminis-
trators stressed however, that they "could not confront
until we're viable", and the director and the assistant
director emphasized the need to "establish friendships",
"work with agencies", "provide technical assistance and
consultation", "open communications", and "re-orient agency
thinking".
In summary then, the administration's approach appeared
to include making use of a youth constituency, but stressed
caution and a heavy reliance on "within the system".
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Defining An Approoriate Methodology --
The Staff's Perspective
Interviews with line staff,2 on the other hand,
revealed a much shorter time-table for creating change
and a more predominant reliance on "outside the system"
strategies of confrontation. As Chapter III indicated,
this strategy orientation flowed from the staff's poli-
tical ideology, their accountability to their clients
and their limited contact with establishment figures.
One staff member expressed his feeling that the role of
the YRB was to organize clients as a pressure group,
"building neighborhood constituencies.. .and organizing
a loose network of kids city-wide". Furthermore, staff
indicated a willingness to use these pressure groups in
active confrontations with existing agencies, claiming,
The YRB should organize for input into the schools...
It's a huge task but... the Bureau should be LQt
kids -- if you have to cut into the patronage
system, O.K.!...we should be taking public stands
on the schools, the police...forcing agencies to act!
Another staff member felt the Bureau was "more dangerous
out on the streets" than "sitting in offices". Several
of the staff also carried these convictions over to their
own agency. One worker suggested, "We should be working
ourselves out of jobs and putting community people in...
we should be hiring kids".
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The staff was not completely unified, however, in
their attitude toward systems change, as Chapter III also
suggested. As one former worker commented, "Some of the
staff was more committed to direct services than to
change", and staff competed 6n issues of determining
priorities among neighborhoods, target populations,
service needs, and approaches to change. One former
part-time staff member indicated, "They had little incen-
tive to work together, except for friendships". In
general, however, line staff indicated a much stronger
inclination toward confrontive strategies than the admin-
istrative staff, and in times of major city crises (such
as with the schools or police) staff tended to pull to-
gether in feeling the need to take stands and force issues.
Some of the line staff concurred with the administration's
perception of the need to build internal contacts and
establish credibility, but disagreed with the amount of
time that had to be invested in that effort. As one
worker commented, "Yes, You have to establish credibility,
but two years is too long."
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Defining Aoropriate Systems Priorities
The same forces which led to differing adminis-
tration-staff perspectives on methodology, also led to
differing views on defining priorities for change. The
1972 systemic change goals statement of the Bureau does
nQt indicate which agencies or institutions most cri-
tically need changing, what features of those institu-
tions contribute to delinquency, and therefore how-
those institutions should be restructured.
Administrative staff seemed to prefer not to take
a stand on settling change priorities among systems.
The director specifically stated that he did not think
the Bureau should be setting priorities, but rather should
"remain flexible", letting the communities define a
priority of needs as they arose. The assistant director
added further that she thought they "should work with
agencies which look like they can move". This refusal
to specify priorities for systems to be changed allowed
,the administration to avoid the threatening position of
open confrontation with specific Cambridge agencies.
Line staff saw this refusal as opportunistic.
One former worker commented,
If the primary goal of the Bureau was, for example,
to open employment opportunities for kids, then
that gives a clear message. It's debatable as an
aim, and you can begin to measure yourself. They
made the purpose something impossible to measure,
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which means no one can really criticize you. It
gives you maximum flexibility. You can be all
things to all people as the opportunities present
themselves...or, you can be nothing to all people.
Line staff members, on the other hand, were much
more likely, in interviews, to specify definite priorities
among the institutions and issues they thought the YRB
should be attacking. The choices of staff were not always
in agreement and individual opinions were not well formu-
lated but staff did indicate priorities among agencies,
sometimes specifying racism, or lack of vocational
orientation, for example, as primary institutional pro-
blems. Again, because of their closeness and feeling of
accountability to their clients, line staff tended to
want to establish Bureau priorities according to the needs
and problems most often articulated by their youth.
Particularly during a crisis, the staff was likely to
want to establish "the schools" or "the police" as
primary targets for change, sometimes even with little
apparent regard for the YRB's ability to affect those
systems.
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Staff -.Administration Conflicts
It is not surprising that conflicts soon developed
between administration and line staff. By virtue of
their defined roles, staff and administration had widely
different perspectives on the nature of the YRB's resources,
leverage, and constraints: the fact that their tasks
wihtin the YRB were conflicting meant that they had
limited ,appreciation or sympathy for each others' points
of view.
The conflicts which occurred between the YRB
administration and the line staff apparently followed a
fairly consistent pattern: because of the relative cau-
tiousness of the administration, the line staff typically
took the lead in developing and implementing proposals
for change. Because of their perspective on change
strategies, these proposals tended to involve mobilizing
their constituency and openly confronting agencies and
institutions. Characteristically, complaints would then
stream in from officials and threatened agency heads with
the director typically finding himself "in a tough posi-
tion", having to decide "who to back" and "sometimes
backing outside people against the staff." At other times,
even when the director supported his staff, the city
administration subtly blocked YRB action; and since staff
workers had little contact with city officials, they often
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blamed the director for these delays, assuming that he
was not really advocating their cause with the city.
Each such incident served then to further alienate line
staff and heighten the tension between staff and admin-
istration. A few examples will serve to illustrate
the pattern.
During the height of a crisis in the Cambridge
Public Schools, when there were race riots, youth staying
out of school in protest of school policies, and a threat
that the schools would be closed down, YRB street workers
felt compelled to take a stand on the school issue. Staff
began circulating a petition calling for the resignation
of the Superintendent of Schools, and a staff member
related his views in an interview on television. The
YRB director explained,
...staff get on Channel 2 T.V. and say, 'I am a
YRB worker...and then proceed to attack the schools
and the superintendent...Well, you see, the YRB
can't do that as a city agency -- you just can't
attack another city agency. I got all kinds of
flack coming in from the Mayor, for the City
Manager, from the schools...'
The staff was then extremely resentful and angered when
the director "backed off" from their position, lectured
the staff, and sought conciliation.
In another instance illustrating the same pattern,
four staff members developed extensive plans for a
medical testing project. The project was to include a
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semester course in the high school to train youth as
paramedics, a summer project of door-to-door neighbor-
hood testing for such diseases as Sickle Cell Anemia,
tuberculosis, and lead poisoning, and follow-up programs
to expose youth to career options in the medical field.
The workers did extensive groundwork to secure promises
of outside grants to support youth salaries and to secure
commitments from doctors to volunteer time for training
and supervision. The administration blocked the program
just prior to implementation however. The feeling of the
four staff members was that the director
saw the projects as too threatening -- they meant
that other city agencies, like the Cambridge City
Hospital or the schools, weren't doing their job.
The hospital was supposed to have a lead poisoning
program and a sickle cell anemia program, but they
weren't reaching the people who needed them.
They saw the director's move as an attempt to "avoid
conflict" and "keep in good with the power structure".
The four workers were extremely alienated, and three
of them eventually resigned.
Another example which illustrates how staff some-
times blamed the administration for city imposed delays
concerned the hiring of youth in significant positions
within the YRB. Several staff members felt that since
it was the long-range objective of the Bureau to increase
youth opportunities for self-determination and income
earning, the YRB should take the lead in hiring youth
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and promoting their participation and control within the
Bureau. The administration concurred, but believed that
the YRB had to progress slowly so as not to jeopardize
the credibility of the agency in the eyes of the courts,
police, city government, other agencies, etc. The Bureau
did decide to hire several youths on a part-time basis
through a contract arrangement, but the Bureau was unable
to pay the youths because of city delays in processing the
paperwork. "It took six months to get two kids paid,"
commented a former street worker, "and twelve kids still
haven't been paid since last summer." (March, 1973 inter-
view) Some of the youths quit and the Bureau's credibility
with its youth clientele was damaged. Several of the
staff members believed that the director was partially
to blame for the delays. Similar incidents occurred on
the issue of putting youth and community representatives
on the Board and on the issue of securing a building from
the city to house a model teen center.
Numerous other examples could be cited, all conforming
to the same general pattern. The cumulative effect of these
incidents was to increase the separation and level of
hostility between the administrative and line staffs. As
service staff became increasingly frustrated, their proposals
became more radical and rebellious, ranging at times from
forming youth unions to burning the schools. The adminis-
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tration, in reaction, became increasingly cautious,
trying to keep the staff divided and contained. Former
staff members have described the Bureau at this time
(roughly from the end of 1971 to fall, 1972) as being
"paralyzed into inaction" with "all of its psychic
energy turned inward" in a struggle for the control of
the Bureau and the right to establish its policy direction.
Personal hostilities ran high, and there was generally
"low morale, no confidence in the agency's ability to
do anything". Former administrative support staff, who
had contact with many local agencies, reported that the
internal discension was evident to outsiders and severely
hurt YRB credibility.
The conflict peaked in the Spring of 1972 when the
director decided that it was necessary to take firm con-
trol of the, agency. In April, he announced the hiring
of a "program administrator" over the objections of a staff
administration Board personnel subcommittee, which had
preferred another candidate. The program administrator
was given responsibility for developing new programs,
providing consultation to agencies, and supervising all
staff. At the same time, the director declared that
there would be no more staff meetings or staff participation
in administrative decisions, and, as one former worker put
it, "The hint was, if you didn't like it you could leave".
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The staff fought back briefly with an abortive
attempt to force the director to resign. All but three
staff signed a thirty page position paper requesting the
resignation, but the group delayed seeking Governor's
Committee support and taking a public stand hoping to
win over the hesitant three. In the interim the news
was leaked to the director, and the new administrative
arrangement began to erode staff unity. Staff were iso-
lated from contact with the director and other staff in
what workers perceived as a "divide and conquer" strategy.
Staff unity weakened; and fatigue, frustration, and
alienation resulted in a series of resignations by
dissident staff.
Although limited discussion continued through the
end of 1972, control of the agency clearly shifted to the
director and the program administrator with an accompanying
change in the method of operation of the Bureau. The
new staff that was hired included more professionals than
the staff that left, and at least two outside agency per-
sonnel observed that the new staff consisted of "more
insiders, with political ties within the city". The
director also established a fairly strict vertical chain
of command in the agency, ranging from those who worked
directly with individual youth to "neighborhood advocates"
to "program developers", who led the community teams,
122
to the program administrator to the director. The job
description and activities of "program developers"
suggest less direct involvement with youth and more
concentration on technical assistance to existing agencies
and planning community projects. The overall impact of
the new structure was to reduce the number of workers
directly involved with youth and to isolate youth workers
from each other and from direct input into policy decisions.
The director indicated that the new structure allowed more
efficient decision-making and was the only way to rescue
the agency from its previous "paralysis".
The new structure appears to signal a shift in the
primary goal and direction of the Bureau as well as a
resolution of the issue of appropriate systems change
strategies. A recent interview (April, 1973) with the
director revealed that he was trying to move the Bureau
toward the goal of establishing itself as an ongoing city
agency with general responsibility for providing a range
of youth services -- which he indicated might include
foster care, alternative education programs, and general
neighborhood-based counseling. He also saw the possibility
of the YRB assuming responsibility for "stubborn child"
cases if the State legislature decriminalized that "offense";
and he hoped that .the Bureau would gain control of the
city teen centers and run them as neighborhood multi-service
centers for youth. The director conceded that this shift
123
into a city service provision who would involve "increasing
bureaucratization" and "a more limited capacity for systems
change"; though he hoped to help "keep the YRB from becoming
like any other city department" by "programming in consti-
tuent participation and control" through "neighborhood
councils". The director expressed some regret at having
to pursue this course of action, but he saw it as essential
to the survival of the agency. "We'd privately incorporate
if we could", he indicated,
but with revenue sharing coming down from Washington,
...those Cyouth service bureaus: that didn't estab-
lish a place for themselves in their cities aren't
going to survive. All the federal money is going to
be going through the cities ... If there's one
thing I want to do before I leave here, its to
institutionalize this place!
Several former YRB staff workers, and officials
from the Governor's Committee, the City administration,
and several public and private agencies also perceived
this shift in the goal priorities of the YRB: although
they tended to describe the shift less charitably as "moving
toward the goal of establishing itself as a city bureau-
cracy" or simply "empire-building". Thus it would appear
that after a period of prolonged conflict, the YRB is now
proceeding toward the goal of establishing itself as a city
institution, leaving the future of the systems change goal
in doubt. As one former staff worker described the change,
"We had hoped to establish the YRB as a kids' agency...but
it looks like it belongs to the city now."
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Effecting Social Change --
An Assessment of the YRB's Impact
Systems (or social) change has been defined as any
change in the number, internal structure, or patterns of
interaction of institutions (or services) within a system
or related systems such that youth access to power or
services is improved. Most observers of the YRB have
perceived it as an organization which has had little impact
in causing systems change. Internal conflicts consumed
most of the Bureau's energies and led to a series of false
starts and abandoned efforts as line and administrative
staff failed to agree on appropriate projects and often
compromised each others' efforts. Many of the projects
which were completed were minor or not significantly re-
lated to changing systems -- a black cosmetics course, a
poster project documenting existing youth emergency services,
a summer camp project, etc.
Nonetheless, in its three year history, the YRB
engaged in several major social change efforts, and some
of these have been fairly successful. It is instructive
to briefly examine a few of these efforts because they
shed light on at least four issues related to the capa-
bility of a juvenile delinquency agency to effect social
change:
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--What were the points of entry which the YRB was able to
use to intervene in existing systems? What agency
characteristics made intervention possible?
--What were some of the advantages of city funding and
affiliation as resources for effecting systems change?
--What were some of the advantages of strong community
affiliations as social change resources?
--What were some of the conflicts inherent in the use of
thses two sets of resources?
In general, the Cambridge YRB was most successful
in gaining entry into existing systems at the fringe of
agency mandates. Opportunities to intervene most often
occurred because a subgroup of the agency's target popu-
lation created special problems for smooth and efficient
agency functioning. Generally, the problem subgroup
consisted of youth who came to the agency's attention,
but did not fit the agency's perception of its clients
and the service network. 3 For youth service institutions,
(such as the schools or teen centers, for example, which
saw the service network as a "production delivery network",
and viewed their clients as customers) the disruption
caused by troublesome "deviant" youth most often yielded
the YRB an opportunity to intervene in the service delivery
of that institution. For example, the Superintendent of
Recreation indicated that, "there's no delinquency pre-
vention component as such to what we do...that's not our
job", and as Chaper II suggested, he was not anxious to
have to be involved with youths who vandalized or other-
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wise disrupted teen centers or other facilities. Conse-
quently, the superintendent was willing to seek outside
assistance in coping with special youth problems, such
as drug use in and around recreation facilities, which
presented staff with difficulties. He indicated that he
hoped that "an agency like the YRB could come in and run
a drug education program for recreation departmert staff".
The role which the superintendent wanted the YRB to play
clearly was limited, but the problem presented the Bureau
with a potential opportunity to intervene and have some
influence over the manner in which Recreation Department
staff delivered services to youth. Furthermore, in cases
when the Recreation Department's ability to function was
totally disrupted, the YRB had a much greater opportunity
to intervene beyond a limited role. For example, after
a police brutality incident in East Cambridge, rioting
youth completely disrupted the local teen center which,
youth indicated in interviews, was considered particularly
unresponsive to their needs. The Recreation Department
felt compelled to close the teen center down, indicating,
"We won't put up with these things." East Cambridge
citizens and politicians insisted on their right to a
city Teen Center however, and the city administration
felt compelled to take action to help alleviate the stress
in that neighborhood. The crisis created a situation in
which the city was responsive to the YRB's offer to reopen
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the teen center with greater youth participation and to
provide an expanded range of non-athletic services which
the youth desired.
Similar opportunities for the YRB to take on "trou-
blemakers" from other agencies presented themselves at
the Cambridge schools. A growing group of drop-outs
who "hung out" outside the library between the two public
high schools began to disrupt the smooth functioning of
the library and the two schools. The librarian and
school officials approached the YRB for assistance (since
YRB workers were often seen with the same youngsters),
providing the YRB with the opportunity to propose running
a limited alternative education program inside the library
building during specialized hours.
Other agencies provided the YRB with opportunities
for intervention because they saw working with youth as
being of the fringe of their mandate. Thus Cambridge
Community Services (CCS), the local United Fund planning
agency, was receptive to a YRB proposal for coordinating
private and public recreation programming, because while
agency coordination was aprimary CCS mandate, the director
saw "youth programs are a small part of what we do... it's
their bag." As Chapter II suggested, opportunities for YRB
intervention in the criminal justice system were most likely
to occur because of agency difficulty in processing cases
which were only marginally criminal and involved psychological
or social problems.
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For criminal justice, youth service, and other
agencies, then, opportunities for YRB intervention usually
resulted from agency difficulty in dealing with those
youth who came to their attention, but did not fit the
agency's view of its clients and the service network.
The advantages for systems change which accrued to
the YRB because of its city funding and affiliation
largely resulted from their credibility with the city
and private agencies. For example, the director of CCS
indicated that it was the YRB's willingness to make availa-
ble its relatively abundant money and staff time which made
the recreation coordination project possible; and that it
was the credibility of the YRB, the impression that they
"had a direct pipeline to the City Manager" which enticed
private agencies to cooperate, since they hoped to gain
greater access to Recreation Department resources.
The YRB's experience in grantsmanship and their
access to funds from the City of Cambridge, LEAA, and
other Federal sources frequently was a potential lever
for the YRB to introduce, or entice other agencies to
introduce, new or modified services. Two of the most
successful YRB programs were the North Cambridge Pilot
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Project, designed to
stimulate community development of youth programs as
alternatives to criminal activities in a high crime area
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housing project, and the East Cambridge Job Resources
Bank, designed to provide career counseling and open
employment access for high school drop-outs. Both pro-
grams were conceived as demonstration projects which
could lead to expanded recreation and employment programs
city-wide. In both of these cases the YRB, working with
and deriving impetus from local community agencies,
served as a catalyst for preparing proposals and securing
substantial grants from the Governor's Committee and the
City of Cambridge, and contributed its staff time for
development. In other cases the YRB worked with other
agencies to help them prepare grants to perform certain
functions (such as establishing an emergency youth shelter
or a new community-based program in family counseling);
and although internal conflicts obstructed most of these
attempts, the YRB director indicated that he saw control
over future revenue sharing funds as a "major potential
leverage point with private agencies".
The YRB's position as a city agency also gave the
Bureau an advantage for bargaining with the city, especially
in times of crisis, for new or modified services, since it
could offer itself as a viable city agency willing and
available to take on responsibilities. Thus, the City
Council was willing to approve funds for a new teen center
in East Cambridge inder YRB control.
The YRB's strong community affiliations also proved
to be a potentially significant (though underutilized)
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systems change resource in several ways. First, their
neighborhood penetration enabled them to organize local
youth and adults into working groups who could develop
and run new community services. Thus, for example, the
North Cambridge Pilot Delinquency Prevention Project was
possible because YRB street workers were aware of the
need for a project, could identify neighborhood leaders
and interested groups, and bring them together for pur-
poseful action. These groups then became potentially
powerful sources of leadership in attacking other community
problems. (The North Cambridge group became involved,
for example, in an effort to force the local housing
authority to improve conditions in the housing project.)
Secondly, local trust of YRB workers could be capi-
talized upon to build community political pressure groups.
For example, when the City Council was debating the
issue of reopening the East Cambridge teen center, the
YRB was able to "pack the galleries" with its supporters.
Furthermore, street workers saw their ability to precipi-
tate or prevent riots during crisis situations (as with
the schools or the police brutality incident) as a po-
tentially powerful bargaining point with the city and city
agencies.
YRB's knowledge of the communities where they worked
also provided a potential entry into the ventures of other
agencies because of YRB "expertise" in community work.
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For example, CCS wanted to involve the YRB in one of its
projects to revitalize the Cambridge Community Center,
a settlement house in the black section of Cambridge
which faced extinction for lack of use by local residents.
CCS saw the need to do a survey to determine what types
of services the community would utilize, but preferred
to have the YRB develop that information, indicating,
They have rapport with the residents there. They
are actively involved with a lot of the kids. Can
you imagine what the reaction would be if I sent
one of my Call white) staff members in there to
do a survey...
Thus, both city and community affiliation offered
potentially valuable resources to the YRB in its systems
change efforts. Unfortunately, they frequently presented
conflicting opportunities. In the issue of the East
Cambridge teen center, the YRB managed to use both of
these resources to maximum advantage, using both the
political power of their constituency and their credibility
as a City agency to create the opportunity to increase
youth control and change the nature of services being
rendered by the City. And as the director put it, "If we
can set up a model that works there, the other five teen
centers will fall." In most cases, however, City affilia-
tions and community affiliations offered conflicting
opportunities for change, and the YRB was rarely able to
manage these resources as effectively as it did with the
teen center issue. The primary problem was one of
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maintaining credibility with two groups with conflicting
values -- in order to utilize effectively the advantages
of strong community affiliation, it was necessary to
maintain credibility with local "troublemaking" youth
and adults; and in order to utilize the advantages of
City affiliation, it was necessary to maintain credibility
with city officials. As Chapter III and IV have repeatedly
pointed out, however, the perceived needs of youth,
especially "delinquents", often conflicted, sometimes
violently, with the needs of police, schools, and other
agencies to process cases efficiently, deliver a service,
and maintain order. Youth, who often tended to see them-
selves as victimshad dramatically different views of
youth services than many agencies, which tended to view
the youth as "customers", "patients" or "deviants".
In most cases the YRB was simply unable to satisfy the
perceived needs of both groups.
Numerous examples could be cited of the conflicts
which resulted when the YRB attempted to utilize the
resources of both city and community affiliation; but
perhaps the most poignant example involved the Largey
police brutality incident of October, 1972, referred to
several times previously. The incident involved alleged
police beatings of two East Cambridge youths which may
have contributed to the death of one of them. Police:
brutality had been a major issue in East Cambridge and
133
other parts of the city for quite some time, and the
incident touched off weeks of rioting and social dis-
ruption, accompanied by demands for the dismissal of
police officers and increased community control over
police. Many street workers were heavily involved with
participating youths and felt that in order to maintain
credibility with their clients, it was necessary for the
YRB to take a strong stand on the issue. Furthermore,
they believed that their capability to precipitate or
avert rioting presented a strong bargaining advantage in
pressing for action and reform. To take such a strong
stand, however, would clearly jeopardize the Bureau's
credibility with the City administration and the police,
who were trying to maintain order. Furthermore, to do so
would destroy the progress the administration felt it was
making in negotiations with the police for running a police
community education program. The YRB could help improve
its credibility with the City by helping to maintain order
and supporting the City's efforts at investigating the
incident.
In the end, the YRB staff members took independent
actions in both directions, and took no official stand
on the issue. The director reported that discussions
with the police had to be terminated, and several youth
and line staff members reported that "kids saw the YRB as
finking out, cooperating with the police". Consequently,
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the YRB was completely ineffective on an issue of
extremely high priority to its target population.
In conclusion, the overall impact of the YRB,
to date, in effecting systems change has been quite
limited. Their two largest accomplishments appear to
be in the areas of recreation and employment. In the
area of recreation, they have initiated a major new
program in North Cambridge which has provided increased
cultural, educational, vocational, and recreational
programs for youth, has strengthened community organiza-
tion, and probably reduced youth crime to some extent;
although the effectiveness of the program has been ham-
pered by a lack of cooperation with City Hall. The YRB
also appears to be moving towards taking over responsi-
bility for running the City's teen centers, despite stiff
opposition from the Recreation Department. The director
of the YRB indicated that the Bureau intends to separate
the centers as multi-service centers, governed by com-
munity boards, and providing employment opportunities for
youth with in the centers -- a significant departure from
the current service being provided by the Recreation
Department.
In the area of employment, the YRB has successfully
promoted the development of a vocational counseling and
job development center in East Cambridge, which has hired
youth counselors, engendered considerable community
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support and participation, and (according to interviews
with youth and adults) is becoming increasingly well-
known and well-received in the area. The Bureau, in
conjunction with the East Cambridge Job Bank, has also
sponsored the development of a Youth Employment Project,
which has received financial support from the Chamber
of Commerce and the City of Cambridge and is seeking
additional funding. The project won official City
sanction and financial support when it became apparent
that Federal funds would no longer directly support such
summer youth programs as the Neighborhood Youth Corps.;
thereby enabling the YRB to presnt its proposal for a year-
round employment program for youth to replace them. The
project is just starting, but represents a potentially
significant departure from the nature, amount, and admin-
istration of youth employment sources in the City.
Although the YRB appears to be on the verge of
making significant impact on the amount and administrative
control of recreational and employment services for youth,
their long-range impact on youth access to power and
services is difficult to predict. Former YRB workers
have expressed skepticism for example that YRB-run teen
centers will eventually be any different from Recreation
Department-run teen centers. One worker speculated that,
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Hip things will get done in the beginning to
attract people, and they'll bring some hip
people in with some new approaches that really
sound good...but people like that tend to lose
out after the first stage. There'll be youth
involvement in the beginning, but then the kids
will want to do things that the YRB won't want
to happen -- things that could cause too much
trouble, be too threatening...And the YRB will
either stop them, or begin to control their
meetings and activities...the only kids that
Ted the Director will let get to leadership
positions are the ones he can co-opt...Even-
tually it will be another Recreation Department.
Indeed, it is not yet possible to determine
the extent that significant changes in ybuth
access to recreational and employment opportunities
will actually be accomplished.
Thus, as the YRB moves into a more central role
within the Cambridge agency structure, it is difficult
to know what capacity for systems change that role will
provide. It may be significant, however, that the primary
changes which the YRB has been able to implement so far
represent not so much modifications of existing institu-
tions, as they do changes in the shape of the service
network. YRB personnel generally perceive that they had
little impact (despite numerous efforts) on changing the
operation of the schools, the police, the recreation
department, the Division of Employment Security, or
other agencies. Where they appear to have been more
successful has been in absorbing existing services,
creating or encouraging new groups to provide new services,
and in transferring control over service provision from one
agency to another -- that is, changing the content of and
the actors in the service network. This observation
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would appear to be consistent with the finding earlier
that the YRB's opportunities for change tended to occur
at the fringes of other agencies' mandates and the fact
that those existing agencies wanted only limited
YRB involvement and highly resisted major internal
changes. If this observation is correct, then the po-
tentiAl of the YRB for creating sustained change in
youth access to services and power, would appear to be
highly dependent upon the ability of the YRB, and any
new groups which they create, to both maintain control
of services and maintain a pattern of behavior signifi-
cantly different from the agencies they sought to trans-
from. Whether or not they can be successful in this
respect is yet to be determined.
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CHAPTER IV
FOOTNOTES
1. "Within the system" strategies are defined, in the
context, as those strategies which involve working
cooperatively with members of the current power
structure to attain an agency objective. Typical
techniques might include interagency conferences, semi-
nars, task forces, technical assistance, investments
of funds and staff to encourage new agency programs,
sharing of resources. "Outside the system" strategies
are defined as those strategies which involve working
with relatively powerless youth and community groups
('the"constituency") in order to obtain new services
or create changes in current institutions. Typical
techniques might include community organizing, de-
monstrating, filing class action suits, lobbying
through public media, creating competing alternative
settings.
2. The YRB often referred to all non-administrative
staff as "line staff". In this text, the terms
"line staff", "service staff", and "street workers"
are therefore used interchangeably.
3. See Rein, P. 52.
CHAPTER V: LEARNING FROM THE CYRB
Youth services bureaus, as indicated in Chapter One,
were proposed as a strategy for diverting youth from the
"stigmatizing effects" of Juvenile Court; providing more
effective rehabilitation by procuring community based
services and organizing youth to participate in social
change; and for preventing juvenile delinquency through
systems change. Chapters Two, Three, and Four indicate
the results of one particular city's attempt to imple-
ment this strategy. This chapter will try to trace the
implications of that case for evaluating the youth service
bureau strategy. Specifically, it will indicate the kind
of constraints which are likely to be imposed on a youth
service bureau by the criminal justice system, the youth
service system, and by the agency's funding structure.
It will also indicate the variables of internal agency
structure which appear to critically determine the ability
of a youth service bureau to provide a services alternabive
to juvenile court and to prevent delinquency through
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systems change.
A short summary of the overall impact of the
Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau is first presented.
The feasibility of each of the three ycuth service
bureau goals will then be discussed in turn.
Summary -- Overall Impact of the CYRB
After three years of planning and three years of
operation, the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau appears
to have:
--failed as a formal services alternative to juvenile
court,
--had limited effectiveness in modifying systems relevant
to youth opportunity and delinquency causation,
--had its most major impact in the provision of direct
services. The vast majority of youth and community
adults interviewed, as well as many agency represen-
tatives, identified the YRB with its street workers
or one of its programs, and saw the Bureau primarily
as providing a range of direct services aimed at
"helping kids to keep out of trouble". The move to
provision of direct services seems to have occurred
in response to the Budreau's inability to obtain
needed servies for its target population from existing
agencies or institutions.
--initiated the process of establishing itself as a City
institution providing a range of youth services. This
move was made in response to a perceived need for sur-
vival, and in light of a concomitant effort by the city
administration to bring the Bureau under closer city
control, this effort appears likely to suceed.
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Diversion of Cases from Juvenile Court
The purpose and design of youth service bureaus
makes them dependent upon the police and courts (and
to a lesser extent other agencies) for clients. This
section will first examine the constraints the criminal
justice system imposes on the ability of a youth service
bureau to gain referrals, and will then consider the
constraints imposed by other youth-serving agencies.
Youth service bureaus appear to have an advantage
in gaining referrals from the police and courts in that
those agencies, especially juvenile courts, tend to be
overwhelmed with cases. Furthermore, those cases which
are not clearly criminal or which involve severe social
or psychological problems are time-consuming and difficult
to process. Thus there is some incentive for the agencies
to refer such cases to a youth service bureau in order to
improve efficiency in maintaining arrest and clearance
rates or reducing case backlogs.
Two other characteristics of the juvenile justice
system appear to be important, however, in determining
its willingness to cede responsibility for cases. In the
first place, it was found that,at least with respect to
the element of trust, the criminal justice system does
appear to be a fairly bounded system. 1 Policemen, judges,
and probation officers were used to interacting with each
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other; and they demonstrated considerable mistrust of
outside agencies and a disinclination to deal with them.
Secondly, the criminal justice system was observed
to operate primarily on a "social control" model of the
service network. When police, probation, or other court
officers did utilize outside resources, they appeared to
prefer to deal with those agencies which either shared a
"social control" perspective (i.e., viewed their clients
as "deviants") or (at the most) held a "treatment" per-
spective (i.e., viewed their clients as "patients");
they further appeared to mistrust particularly those
agencies which viewed their clients as "victims" and held
an ?advocacy"view of the network.
Accordingly, the YRB's experience with the criminal
justice agencies indicates that there are a number of
variables which may determine the ability of any diver-
sionary program to obtain referrals from the police and
courts:
Relationship to Other Agencies
--The program should be publicly sponsored.
--It should have a formal linkage to the criminal
justice system, either through contact or direct
supervision by police or court officials.
--The program should contain an option to refer
non-cooperative cases back to the court for
issuance of a complaint.
--Police and court officials should have the option
of insisting that a case be handled by adjudication.
--The program should provide regular and complete
feedback to the police and court.
Internal Structure
--The program should have a formal and visible
process for handling cases.
--The program should have the authority to require
a youth and his family to cooperate if necessary.
--The program should be primarily office-based
rather than street-based. Outreach should be
restricted to home visits and follow-up.
Staff and Personnel
--Staff should consist primarily of trained pro-
fessionals and should be well-supervised.
--Youths generally should not be used as staff, and
youth participation in agency decision-making
should be minimal.
Functions to be Performed
--Clientele should consist primarily of those cases
referred by the justice system.
--The primary function should be to provide or
secure individual remedial services or resolve
individual problems.
--Individual advocacy in other cases before the
police or courts should be limited to supplying
information.
--Systems modification efforts should be confined
to "within the system" approaches, since change
efforts directed at the criminal justice system
may jeopardize relationships.
To the extent that a diversion program deviated
from this set of characteristics, police and court
officials would become increasingly concerned that the
program was too far removed from its "system" or was
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providing inappropriate or unnecessary, services. Since
the program would appear to be less directed at fulfilling
police and court needs, those officials would have less
incentive to make referrals.
Other agencies, primarily the schools, which were
intended to be a third source of youth service bureau
referrals, appear to impose very similar constraints on
a diversion program. Most of the agencies which were
intended to be referral sources operate on a "production-
delivery" model of the service network (e.g., schools,
recreation facilities), and apparently expect "social
control" or at least "treatment" of those "deviant" (or
"sick") individuals who disrupt their efficient functioning.
These agencies appear to desire a public program, prefer-
ably with some linkage to the juvenile justice system.
They also appear to have requirements similar to those of
the criminal justice system for staff and internal struc-
tural variables similar to those of the criminal justice
system, and to find individual advocacy or systems change
particularly inappropriate responses to their need to deal
with troublesome youth.
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Establishment of Alternatives to Court
Just as the youth service bureau is dependent upon
the juvenile justice system for referrals, it is also
dependent upon the youth service/child welfare system
to provide community-based services and upon the cooper-
ation of youth to involve them in attempts at systems
change. The demands which youth service agencies and
juvenile clients placed on the youth service bureau,
however, were found to be directly in conflict with the
constraints imposed by the criminal justice system -- thus
making it necessary to reconsider the whole concept of
diversion. This section will examine the constraints
imposed by the youth service sytem, and those imposed
by the clients, and will indicate the implications of
these constraints for the internal functioning of a
Youth Service Bureau.
Unlike the criminal justice system, youth service
agencies do not necessarily view themselves as a "system",
nor do they share a uniform perspective on the service
network. Consequently, the agencies do not have a uniform
set of requisites for accepting referrals, but rather it
would appear that a Youth Service Bureau would be most
likely to be able to use the resources of those agencies
which have a view of the service network similar to
their own.
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The most important constraint imposed by the youth
service system is that the services required for youth
service bureau-clients may not be available. Even in
Cambridge, which is particularly rich in social services,
many of the youth services which were diagnosed as being
necessary either were simply not there, were available
in such an inappropriate manner that most youth refused to
utilize them, or were available, but the agencies pro-
viding them continually screened out YRB dlients as "bad"
and therefore "untreatable". 2 These characteristics
of the youth service system would appear to inhibit a
ysb's ability to provide community-based referrals, thus
forcing substantial reliance on the direct provision of
services and/or more agressive advocacy and systems chane
efforts.
In order to gain the cooperation of delinquent and
potentially delinquent youth, it appears that a program
must respond to another set of structural requisites
imposed by the target population. It is significant that
these characteristics directly conflict with those which
were essential for obtaining referrals from the criminal
justice system. The YRB experience indicates that there
are several variables that determine whether a program
will be accepted by juveniles:
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Relationship to Other Agencies
--The program should have minimal ties to the juvenile
justice system.
Internal Structure
--The program should have a strong outreach com-
ponent, entailing considerable time spent on the
street.
--The program should be non-coercive.
Staff and Personnel
-- At least a good number of the staff should be
as similar in background to the youths as possible,
entailing the hiring of non-professional and others
from the local neighborhoods, perhaps some with
prior criminal records.
--Youth should be given the opportunity to parti-
cipate in agency decision-making and to assume
responsible staff or board roles.
Functions
--The program should be able to provide advocates
in obtaining services which youth consider most
important.
-- The program should be willing to stand behind
individuals as advocates in conflicts with
authority.
-- The program should be willing to take strong
stands on pressing issues of concern to yawth,
especially in times of crisis. It should be
prepared to take an aggressive systems change
role.
It is clear, however, that a program which incor-
porated these features would suffer from internal staff
conflict. In the YRB experience the incorporation of
these features led to a situation where staff preferred
to acquire their own caseloads from the neighborhoods
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rather than work with police and court referrals. Addi-
tionally, in this agency model, staff may tend to reject
a case-by-case orientation in favor of a sysyems change
approach -- particularly in times of crisis.
Thus it appears that the features which the
President's Crime Commission, the NCCD, and others
have recommended as essential to the youth service
bureau concept may actually subvert the diversionary
goal of the program. Some of the recommended features
were youth advocacy and systems change, weak and informal
linkage to the juvenile justice system, lack of coercion
and feedback, reliance on non-professionals, local
residents and ex-criminals for staffing, outreach, and
heavy youth participation. Yet it is these very features
which appear to lead to both a refusal of the criminal
justice system to make referrals and a staff preference
not to accept them.
Diversion Reconsidered
It is not possible to determine from a single
case study exactly how many of the structural requisites
of youth and of the juvenile justice system must be
satisfied in order to gain the acceptance of each group.
Undoubtedly there are trade-offs involved. Nonetheless,
the Cambridge case clearly demonstrates that the goals
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of court diversion and involvement of youth in systems
change are inherently incompatible because they require
conflicting program models. Furthermore, the ability
to provide community-based services as an alternative
to court processing is constrained by the unwillingness
or inability of the youth service system to handle referrals.
Providing juveniles with community-based services and
involving them in systems change efforts may be a very
appropriate and much needed innovation in the way in
which society deals with actual and potential delinquents;
this study suggests, however, that this innovation can
not be introduced into the criminal justice system as
it is presently structured.
This conclusion suggests an inherent limit on the
ability of any program to divert cases from juvenile court
and substitute a less stigmatizing process. Labeling
theory implies that voluntary participation of youth,
involvement of non-delinquents, use of non-professional
community staff, and reliance on community services are
all important means of reducing the stigmatizing effect of
official processes. The Cambridge experience suggests,
however, that these characteristics inhibit the ability
of an agency to obtain referrals. Presumably (as the
Cambridge Intake Program suggests) a program formally
linked to the criminal justice system and adhering to the
other characteristics desired by criminal justice agencieg
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could successfully obtain referrals and at least avoid
formal court handling and the issuance of formal complaints.
It must be recognized, however, that in such a program,
many, if not most, of the services would have to be
provided directly, and that the process would probably
still be stigmatizing.
Furthermore the ability of such a program to
engage in a systems change would probably be quite
limited. Staff would probably be in a central position
to document available services and could call inter-agency
conferences about service problems, encourage outside
groups to establish new services, and perform similar
non-threatening functions; but any substantial undertaking
of social change efforts (especially those involving youth
or tending to produce conflict) appears likely to seriously
compromise the agency's ability to obtain referrals.
Other studies and experiments with diversion pro-
grams lihked to the criminal justice system should help
to clarify the range of variation permissable in the
variables (discovered in this study) which appear to
determine the level of police and court referrals. The
trade-offs between reduced referrals and steps to decrease
stigma and produce systems change need to be clearly
understood in order to evaluate the merit of such programs
properly.
The limitations of this approach, however, suggest
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consideration of diversion programs which are not struc-
turally dependent on the police and courts to obtain
referrals. Although full exposition of these models
is beyond the scope of this thesis, options which would
entail more flexibility might include: introducing youth
service bureaus simultaneously with decriminalization 3
legislation which would provide the bureaus with official
responsibility for certain categories of "offenses"; or
introducing diversion programs which intervene earlier
in the criminal justice probessi.e., programs which con-
centrate on obtaining neighborhood and community agency
referrals. 4 In each of these cases it would be necessary
to resolve the issue of the "due process" rights of
juveniles.
Effecting Change in Systems Relevant to Youth
Unfortunately, the President's Crime Commission
provided very few guidelines for the accomplishment of
this goal -- either in terms of the methods of inter-
vention to be employed or the specific institutional
structures to be changed. The study does shed light
on the way in which particular variables of agency design
are likely to influence the following decisions: the
selection of a methods for change; the selection of
institutional priorities; and the ability to sustain a
systems change model.
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Selecting Strategies for Change
City funding and administrative control provides
a number of advantages, in terms of increased credibility
and improved access to funds, for implementing "within
the system" strategies for change. City funding and
control also tends to constrain an agency from utilizing
"outside the system" confrontive techniques, sinceAt
becomes essential to avoid conflict with City Hall and
city agencies in order to survive.
Funding from higher levels of government or private
groups would appear to create additional freedom to utilize
"outside the system" techniques, since these settings are
more likely to be supportive of social change advocates
and less likely to be directly affected by the operation
of a local agency.
If an agency is internally structured so as to
maximize youth cooperation (as indicated earlier, i.e.,
hires local non-professionals, is non-coercive, uses
detached workers, provides advocacy, etc. -- this structure
is hereafter to be referred to as a "youth-oriented
structure".), then the agency will have a number of ad-
vantages in implementing "outside the system" strategies.
These advantages stem from the ability to mobilize a
constituency to create community programs or exert
pressure on existing institutions. In a more limited way,
this structure could also enhance ability to work within
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the system because it establishes the agency's credibility
as a "community expert".
The use of non-professional community staff in
advocacy roles tends to create strong staff preferences
for "outside the system" strategies, especially in times
of crisis. The use of professional staff with little
direct community contact and substantial contact with
city and agency officials (i.e., a "professionally-oriented
structure") tends to create staff preference for "within
the system" strategies, especially in times of crisis.
Additionally, it would appear that agency dependence
on criminal justice system or youth service system agencies
(for referrals, services or other program elements essen-
tial to survival) increases the need for an agency to
limit itself to "within the system" techniques.
Selecting Institutinnal Priorities
The same variables which critically determine selec-
tion of methods for change are also important in deter-
mining the manner in which an agency assigns priorities
to institutions to be changed. It.would appear that city
funding and administrative control, a "professionally-
oriented structure", and dependence on the criminal justice
and youth service systems, tend to produce a desire nfl
to assign priorities, but rather to respond to opportunities
for intervention as they occur. It would also appear that
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that a "youth-oriented structure" generates considerable
pressure to set priorities according to the needs arti-
culated by the client population, sometimes regardless
of the prospects for successful intervention.
Sustaining a Systems Change Model
These observations from the Cambridge case suggest
that it is essential for a youth service bureau to select
a consistent strategy for change, and a structure appro-
priate to that method if it is to be successful in
planning for delinquency prevention, under a systems
change paradigm. Failure to do so appears likely to
result in self-defeating attempts to maintain credibility
with both a youth constituency and city and agency officials.
It also leads to severe internal staff conflicts over
appropriate strategies for change and institutional prior-
ities. It was seen in this study that these conflicts
can virtually paralyze an. agency and undermine its
capacity for effecting systems change. To the extent
that an agency intends to use both "within the system"
and "outside the system" strategies for change, it would
appear important to utilize a horizontal staff structure, 5
whereby staff members share responsibility for a wide range
of agency functions.
Furthermore, dependence on city funding and sub-
stantial city administrative control may have the effect
of making it difficult for an agency to maintain a goal
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of systems change, since that goal conflicts with city
priorities for maintaining order and stability. A youth
service bureau, or similar agency, is likely to experience
considerable pressure to establish itself as a city
institution with ongoing responsibility for a range of
services in order to survive.
Finally, it would appear that the opportunities
for an independent delinquency prevention agency to
intervene in the existing social structure are likely
to occur at the fringe of agency mandates. These oppor-
tunities result from agency difficulty in handling those
youth who come to their attention, but do not fit the
agency's view of its clients and the service network.
Since opportunities occur at the fringes of agency man-
dates, and since agencies are highly resistant to internal
structural changes, it would appear that an independent
delinquency agency is more likely to produce changes in
the overall hope of the service network than to produce
modifications in existing institutions. Accordingly, an
agency's ability to produce sustained change in youth
access to services and power would appear to be highly
dependent upon that ability (and the ability of any new
groups which they create) to both maintain control of
services gad maintain a pattern of behavior significantly
different from that of the agencies they seek to transform.
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Summary -- Need for Future Research
The youth service bureau strategy, as a means of
providing an alternative to the juvenile court process
and preventing delinquency through systems change, needs
to be critically re-examined in light of the constraints
imposed by the systems in which the youth service bureau
must operate. Specifically, the two goals should be
considered separately in designing models of delinquency
agencies. Directions for future research appropriate to
developing an effective model for court diversion have
been discussed. Additional research is badly needed to
more clearly determine appropriate settings and structures
for agencies which include "changing systems relevant to
youth" as a primary goal. More highly developed theories
of institutional causation of delinquency, and of social
intervention are needed in order to provide such agencies
with direction and consistent patterns of operation.
Ultimately, comprehensive comparative studies of a large
sample of agencies are needed in order to assess the
feasibility of changing youth-related systems through an
independent, comprehensive delinquency agency.
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CHAPTER V
FOOTNOTES
1. See Weiss, p. 200 for further elaboration of this
concept of "system".
2. This last problem is obviously exacerbated by association
with the criminal justice system.
3. "Decriminalization" refers to the process of legally
redefining "offenses" such that they no longer
carry the possibility of criminal sanctions.
4. Variations of this approach are used in the Scandi-
navian countries and in China with promising results.
The Scandinavian countries rely on child welfare
committees instead of courts; and in China, complaints
are handled by neighborhood committees, and the courts
are used only as a means of last resort for those pro-
blems which the committees cannot resolve. It is
not clear whether or not these approaches are trans-
ferrable to the American social structure.
5. Horizontal staff structure, at a minimum, refers to
a sharing of responsibility for agency tasks and
decision-making among all staff. For a further
discussion of the concept, see Ira Goldenberg,
Build Me a Mountain, Youth, Poverty, and the Crea-
tion of New Settings. (cambridge, 1971). pp. 126-
130, 426-436.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
THE YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU
REFERRAL FLOW CHART
Schools, Social Agencies
Parents, YSB Outreach Staff
Self
Ref rral Law Enforcement Agcencies
COMMUNITY RESOURCES
Family Counseling
Special Education
Recreation Program
Guided Group Interaction
Mental Health Services
Tutoring
Job Placement
Group Residence
Foster Home
Health Services
Individual Counseling
Day Treatment Centers
Big Brother or Sister
Camp Experience
Neighborhood Youth Corps
Leadership Training
Parent Study Groups
After-School Programs
Drop-In Center; Lounge
Financial Aid
Other
a)
-Ii
P4
a4 )
0 0
.H
Lj
Court
__Intake -- 0
Shelter I Detention
1---- Probation JUDGE
Diagnostic
Center
eInstitutional
Afecarj Resources
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
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YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU
(Voluntary Service Only)
Identifies Droblems ; refers to agencies; continues contact;
Strengthens resources; purchases and coordinates services;
Develops new resources through citizen and youth action;
Modifies systems through consultation and demonstration
----------- 
---- -- ----
APPENDIX B
DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS
IN CAMBRIDGE
PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE YRB
POLICE APPREHENSION
POLICE JUVENILE OFFICER
I
JUVENILE COURT SESSION
MIDDLESEX COUNTY THIRD
DISTRICT COURT
I
POLICE DEPARTMENT
SATURDAY MORNING SESSION
RELEASE
"DELINQUENT"
YOUTH
SERVICE
BOARD
(DETENTION)
PROBATION
"NO FINDING" *
SUSPENDED
SENTENCE
RELEASE
"NOT DELINQUENT"
I
RELEASE
I
LONG CONTINUANCE"*
RELEASE FORMAL FINDING
"DELINQJUENT" ***
* Enough evidence for conviction, but no formal finding.
** Required supervision, i.e., probation without
delinquency finding
*** See "Delinquent" above.
From September 1969 Proposal
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APPENDIX C
INITIAL YOUTH RESOURCES BUREAU
Staff Organization Chart
From September 1969 Proposal
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APPENDIX D
1973 YRB STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART
(Approximate)
CIYMANAGER
ADVISORY
BOARD Y 'TRB
DIRECTOR]
PROGRAM
ADMINISTRATOR
RECEPTIONIS'I]
ADMINISTHATIVE
ASSISTANT
EAST CAMBRIDGE
JOB BANK
NORT H - CAMBRIDGE
PROJECT
PROGRAM
DEVELOPERS (3)
NEIGHBORHOOD
ADVOCATES (3)1
Outreach
or
"line staff"
YOUTH I
ADVOCATES (3) |
I
I
ASSISTANTDIRECTOR
I
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